Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking by Ingber, Rebecca
Boston University School of Law
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
Summer 2013
Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch
Legal Decisionmaking
Rebecca Ingber
Boston University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the President/Executive Department Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly
Commons at Boston University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 38 Yale Journal of International Law 359 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/259
INGBER DRAFT 12 7.25.13 (FINAL PROOF).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/25/13 3:59 PM 
 
  
Article 
Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch 
Legal Decisionmaking 
Rebecca Ingber† 
I.	   INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 360	  
II.	   EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEGAL DECISIONMAKING ........................................................................... 366	  
A.	   What Are Interpretation Catalysts? ................................................................................. 366	  
B.	   Disaggregating Decisionmaking ..................................................................................... 368	  
1.	   Interpretation Catalysts Empower Different Executive Actors .......................... 368	  
2.	   Interpretation Catalysts Trigger Different Mechanisms for Decisionmaking .... 372	  
III.	   THE ROLE OF INTERPRETATION CATALYSTS IN SHAPING EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEGAL 
DECISIONMAKING ....................................................................................................................... 377	  
A.	   The Defensive Litigation Catalyst .................................................................................. 378	  
1.	   Who Has the Pen? ............................................................................................... 379	  
2.	   Mechanisms for Coordination and Decision ....................................................... 381	  
3.	   Contextual Pressures and Utility of the Litigation Catalyst ................................ 384	  
B.	   The Treaty Body Reporting Catalyst .............................................................................. 391	  
1.	   Who Has the Pen? ............................................................................................... 392	  
2.	   Mechanisms for Coordination and Decision ....................................................... 393	  
3.	   Contextual Pressures and Utility of the Treaty Body Reporting Catalyst .......... 395	  
C.	   Speechmaking as Interpretation Catalyst ........................................................................ 397	  
1.	   Who Has the Pen? ............................................................................................... 399	  
2.	   Mechanisms for Coordination and Decision ....................................................... 401	  
3.	   Contextual Pressures and Utility of the Speechmaking Catalyst ........................ 401	  
IV.	   COMPARING CATALYSTS, A CASE STUDY: THE 2005-2006 REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE 
AGAINST TORTURE ..................................................................................................................... 403	  
V.	   IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERPRETATION CATALYST PHENOMENON ............................................ 412	  
 
 †  Associate Research Scholar, Columbia Law School; 2011-2012 Council on Foreign 
Relations International Affairs Fellow and Hertog National Security Law Fellow, Columbia Law 
School. I served from 2006 to 2012 in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State. 
The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of 
State or the U.S. Government. In addition to works cited, I have relied on information and wisdom 
received from many current and former officials from throughout the U.S. government who were 
extraordinarily helpful and generous with their time. In particular I am indebted to Evelyn Aswad, John 
Bellinger, Sarah Cleveland, Lori Damrosch, Lara Flint, Joseph Guerra, Avril Haines, Robert Harris, 
Karen Hecker, Steven Hill, Sandra Hodgkinson, Richard Jackson, Frank Jimenez, Martin Lederman, 
Robert Loeb, Julie Martin, Thomas Monheim, Vijay Padmanabhan, and Sabeena Rajpal. I would also 
like to thank Kate Andrias, William Banks, Jennifer Daskal, Ashley Deeks, Harold Koh, Peter 
Margulies, Daniel Meltzer, Anton Metlitsky, Gillian Metzger, Trevor Morrison, Julian Mortenson, 
Alexandra Perina, David Pozen, Daphna Renan, Sharmila Sohoni, Matthew Waxman, Benjamin Wittes, 
and Saul Zipkin as well as members of the Columbia Law School Fellows Workshop and the 2012 
meeting of the American Society of International Law’s Interest Group on International Law in 
Domestic Courts, held at Duke Law School, for helpful comments on drafts. 
INGBER DRAFT 12 7.25.13 (FINAL PROOF).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/25/13  3:59 PM 
360 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 38: 359 
 
A.	   Implications for Scholarship ........................................................................................... 412	  
B.	   Implications for Advocates ............................................................................................. 414	  
C.	   Implications for the Courts ............................................................................................. 416	  
D.	   Implications for Executive Branch Actors ...................................................................... 419	  
VI.	   CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 421	  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenarios in which the United States government 
must establish a position on its legal authority to detain in a nontraditional 
conflict such as that with al Qaeda. First, envision exigent combat 
circumstances: U.S. military operatives find themselves confronting individuals 
connected to al Qaeda whom they would like to capture and detain, and must 
determine the scope of their legal authority to do so. Now imagine this question 
arises in the context of a major report the United States is due to provide to the 
monitoring committee for a human rights treaty, explaining its understanding of 
its obligations under and compliance with the provisions of that treaty. Finally, 
consider how this interpretation might play out if U.S. officials were first asked 
to state the government’s legal authority for detention in the context of 
litigation brought by individuals who allege that the government has unlawfully 
detained them. Might the executive’s position on its legal authority, or even its 
willingness to stake out a position, differ depending on which of these contexts 
first triggers the question for legal decisionmakers? If so, why? 
Each of these scenarios presents an example of what this Article terms an 
“interpretation catalyst”—a distinct triggering event compelling the U.S. 
government to consider, determine, and potentially assert an interpretation of 
its obligations and authority under domestic or international law. Interpretation 
catalysts exist in countless forms and play a significant and at times decisive 
role in shaping the executive’s legal and policy1 decisionmaking processes and 
ultimate decisions. Interpretation catalysts can drive the executive branch to 
crystallize a legal view on a matter that is entirely novel; can bring a formerly 
identified but dormant issue into urgent focus; and can transfer an issue from 
one decisionmaking forum to another.2 The resulting processes triggered by 
these catalysts then have dramatic—and often predictable—effects on the 
executive’s ultimate position. That position and the catalyst that influences it 
are all the more important because of the stickiness of executive decisions, and 
legal positions in particular, once taken. This Article explores the critical role 
played by interpretation catalysts in influencing the executive’s ultimate 
substantive legal decisions, including by determining a particular question’s 
 
 1. Determining the lawful parameters of executive action is only one piece of the policy 
decisionmaking scheme. Yet because of the complexity and interconnectedness of law and policy in this 
arena, as well as the necessity for guidance on questions of legal policy in addition to those of pure legal 
interpretation, executive branch lawyers play a critical role and their decisions and advice heavily 
inform the scope of options available. 
 2. See infra Part II. 
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point of entry within the government, framing the task, shaping the interpretive 
process, establishing the relative influence of the relevant actors, and informing 
the contextual pressures and interests that may bear on the decision. 
The executive does not bind itself easily to new legal constraints, nor 
does it ordinarily do so in the absence of a forceful catalyst.3 This is all the 
more true in matters of national security. Nevertheless, due to broad judicial 
deference and sufficient congressional acquiescence (with some notable 
exceptions), executive branch legal positions are often the critical (and at times 
the only) relevant substantive statements of law in this area.4 The executive’s 
interpretation of its national security authority is therefore extremely significant 
and can often serve not only as one step in an inter-branch interpretive dance, 
but as lawmaking itself. 
How this legal decisionmaking occurs remains fairly opaque, even despite 
great speculation in recent years. Vigorous debate rages over executive 
authority and its limits: why the executive arrives at particular understandings 
of its legal constraints,5 why presidential administrations break with or continue 
the legal positions and policies of their predecessors,6 whether sufficient 
structural constraints—including internal executive offices—exist to rein in 
otherwise unbridled presidential power,7 and the extent to which the executive 
is truly constrained by law at all.8 Nevertheless the process of executive legal 
 
 3. See infra Section II.A. 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 89-90. 
 5. See infra Section V.A. 
 6. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY 
AFTER 9/11, at 25-28 (2012) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT] (discussing structural 
limitations on the Obama administration’s ability to change national security positions once in office, 
though focusing primarily on what Goldsmith views as rational reasons for consistency). 
 7.  See, e.g., Neal Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316 (2006); Gillian Metzger, The Interdependent 
Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009). There 
has been a vibrant debate in recent years concerning the role of the Department of Justice Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC) and whether it serves to constrain and defend—or merely rubber-stamp—
Presidential authority. This debate stems in part from controversies involving the Bush-era OLC, which 
critics accused of over-politicization and of providing rubber-stamp legal justification for extralegal 
activity and abuse; thus, much scholarship has focused on either lambasting or resurrecting the office’s 
role in executive branch legal interpretation. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, REPUBLIC] (proposing, inter alia, the 
creation of an independent “Supreme Executive Tribunal” within the executive branch with binding 
authority to answer legal questions); Bruce Ackerman, Lost Inside the Beltway, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 13 
(2011), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol124forum_ackerman.pdf; Katyal, supra, at 
2337 (arguing that the adjudicative function of OLC should be stripped away from its advisory function, 
and “transferred to a separate official, a Director of Adjudication, who would resolve inter-agency 
disputes”); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688 (2011) [hereinafter 
Morrison, Alarmism] (challenging Ackerman’s critique of the OLC and his proposed reforms); Trevor 
W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch 
Legal Inteprretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 63 (2011) [hereinafter Morrison, Libya], 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol124_forum_morrison.pdf; Bruce Ackerman, Legal 
Acrobatics, Illegal War, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at A27 [hereinafter Ackerman, Legal Acrobatics]. 
 8.  See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010); Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381 
(2012). Moreover, international law theorists have explored how activities of diverse individuals within 
and outside government inform international law compliance. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, 
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decisionmaking itself remains relatively mysterious. Yet process—and the 
catalysts for decisionmaking that help shape that process—has a significant 
impact on the executive’s view of its own authority. Consideration of the 
interplay between these catalysts and the enormous diversity of actors and 
processes within the executive that overlap, collide and collaborate to formulate 
executive decisions provides valuable texture to these dialogues on executive 
authority.9 
Current scholarship on executive lawyering tends to focus predominantly 
on select offices—in particular, the Office of the Solicitor General10 and the 
Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice,11 and to a lesser extent 
individual agency general counsels12—as well as on the bilateral relationship 
between each of these offices and the White House. But there has been very 
little exploration of the broader interaction among executive branch legal 
offices and the role of these dynamics in decisionmaking. A handful of scholars 
have considered the broader spectrum of legal actors throughout the executive; 
and yet—despite the acknowledgment and even reliance by much 
administrative law scholarship on the existence of multiple deciders within the 
executive branch13—there is a tendency within the emerging literature on 
interagency legal decisionmaking to employ a President-focused, unitary-
decider view of this process.14 Under this view the proliferation of legal advice 
from different actors throughout the executive simply provides greater options 
for the President among which to choose.15 The assumption underlying this 
 
International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 207 
(1993); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 206 (1996). 
 9. See infra Sections II.B, V.A. 
 10. See, e.g., Rebecca Mae Salokar, Politics, Law, and the Office of the Solicitor General, in 
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 59 
(Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995). 
 11. See ACKERMAN, REPUBLIC, supra note 7; Ackerman, Legal Acrobatics, supra note 7; 
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 7; Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 7; Morrison, 
Libya, supra note 7. 
 12. For a rare look at the role of agency general counsel offices, see Michael Herz, The 
Attorney Particular: Governmental Role of the Agency General Counsel, in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, 
supra note 10, at 143. For an unprecedented historical account of the State Department Office of the 
Legal Adviser, see MICHAEL SCHARF & PAUL WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS 
(2010). 
 13. See infra notes 37-38. 
 14. For rare exceptions, see ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL 
CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 13-24 (1974), which describes the reality of interagency legal and policy 
decisionmaking during the Cuban missile crisis; GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 6; 
and JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 167 (2007) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY], which discusses the 
virtues of coordinated interagency process in legal decisionmaking. 
 15. See, e.g., Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive 
Branch Is a They Not an It, 96 MINN. L. REV. 194 (2011) (examining the diversity of potential legal 
advice within the executive branch and concluding that it provides the President with greater options and 
thus keeps international law somewhat flexible); see also Ackerman, Legal Acrobatics, supra note 7 
(criticizing the Obama Administration for, in his view, creating a precedent in which a President could 
“organize a supportive ‘coalition of the willing’ made up of the administration’s top lawyers,” in order 
to get support from “one or two [which] would be enough to push ahead and claim that the law was on 
the president’s side”). 
INGBER DRAFT 12 7.25.13 (FINAL PROOF).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/25/13  3:59 PM 
2013] Interpretation Catalysts 363 
  
approach is that the President has an outcome he or she prefers, and thus relies 
on the existence of multiple advisors in order to increase the likelihood that at 
least one will be willing to provide legal justification for that outcome.16 
This Article explores interagency legal decisionmaking from a different 
perspective. Rather than viewing executive legal interpretation from the 
President down, I examine the diverse kinds of catalysts, external and internal, 
that trigger decisionmaking from the bottom up and horizontally, and how these 
catalysts inform the processes, players, and ultimate decisions that may either 
never reach the President, or reach him in a packaged, processed form that will 
heavily inform his decisionmaking.17 The President-as-unitary-decider model 
described above may account for some limited, rare circumstances, but it does 
not represent the ordinary process in which legal positions are factored into—
and may weed out—policy options at lower levels before reaching the 
President’s desk, even when he is the ultimate decider on the broader 
package.18 It certainly does not account for the vast majority of decisions that 
do not reach the Oval Office, and thus places an outsized emphasis on the 
President’s role in coordinating disagreement between agencies over particular 
matters of legal interpretation. 
Almost all legal decisionmaking within the executive is far more complex 
than the model of one decider choosing among all possible options.19 The 
exploration of executive branch decisionmaking presented here is influenced in 
part by scholarship in organizational theory and behavioral economics 
observing how institutional design and process, framing and sequencing of 
decisions, and individual actors themselves can and do have a significant 
impact on decisionmaking and ultimately on substance.20 Political and 
behavioral scientists have long explored the significant effects of framing and 
sequencing of choices on individuals’ subsequent decisions.21 Scholars have 
 
 16. Ackerman, Legal Acrobatics, supra note 7. 
 17. See, e.g., Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 
VA. L. REV. 561 (1977). 
 18. Id.; see infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 19. See, e.g., Morrison, Libya, supra note 7, at 67. In response to Ackerman’s criticism—
based on press reports regarding the President’s legal decisionmaking process regarding actions in 
Libya—that the President had simply chosen the legal advice that favored his preferred outcome, 
Morrison states: “From my own time in public service I know all too well that the reality of government 
decisionmaking is often much more complicated than appears in the press.” Id. 
 20. This Article follows in the path broken by Graham Allison in Essence of Decision. 
GRAHAM ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971). Allison 
incorporated organizational and politics models of bureaucratic decisionmaking to illustrate the 
criticality of process and politics to decisionmaking. Scholars of the Presidency have continued to 
explore these influences since and have built on this work. See, e.g., ROGER B. PORTER, PRESIDENTIAL 
DECISION MAKING: THE ECONOMIC POLICY BOARD (1980) (explaining the structures presidents employ 
for managing the executive bureaucracy and their own effectiveness); JAMES Q. WILSON, 
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989); see also infra notes 
37-38 (discussing administrative law scholarship addressing institutional design and executive 
decisionmaking). 
 21. See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance 
Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 224, 238 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) 
(arguing that consumers’ insurance decisions vary according to framing of premiums and benefits); 
Peter Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2010) (finding that decisional sequencing 
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shown, for example, that strategic casting and sequencing of questions on a 
club’s meeting agenda can alter the outcome of voting by a group of 
individuals inclined toward a different position,22 and others have proposed that 
simply rearranging the location of food options in a school cafeteria would 
dramatically alter children’s consumption of French fries and carrot sticks.23 I 
suggest that these effects can be compounded dramatically in an organizational 
context. In organizational—and here executive branch—decisionmaking, the 
individuals involved and their functions may actually change, and the entire 
decisionmaking structure may organize differently according to the task at 
hand. In other words, to use the club meeting example, imagine the 
compounded effect of these behavioral influences if the actual voting group 
might transform into a different set of individuals—with a different chair of the 
meeting and some voting members replaced by others, with different priorities 
and biases—depending on the nature of the meeting agenda. Such is the nature 
of much executive branch legal decisionmaking. Thus, while behavioral effects 
continue to operate on individual actions in executive lawyering as in any 
decisionmaking, they also play out on a colossal scale when the actor is not 
simply one individual but rather a massive, multifaceted organization whose 
decisionmaking gears shift into entirely different places and whose individual 
players reshuffle depending on the framing of the initial triggering event. 
While the focus of this Article is the role of interpretation catalysts in 
shaping international law and national security legal interpretation within the 
executive branch, this phenomenon is by no means limited to government 
action, national security, or legal interpretation. The “interpretation catalyst” 
phenomenon might be applied to decisionmaking of any kind within any 
sufficiently complex bureaucracy. I focus here on executive branch legal 
interpretation in these areas because of the importance of the legal questions at 
stake, the stickiness of these decisions once taken and thus their long-lasting 
effects on executive positions, and the outsized role the executive bureaucracy 
plays in determining the law that binds it. Moreover, matters of national 
security and international law lend themselves well to this study, as a broad 
range of decisionmakers operate throughout the executive on matters of 
overlapping jurisdiction and interest, and legal and policy questions often have 
 
can affect judicial decisions); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in 
Decisionmaking, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988) (finding that decision makers exhibit a 
significant bias toward the status quo); Daniel M. Isaacs, Note, Baseline Framing in Sentencing, 121 
YALE L.J. 426, 449 (2011) (finding that judges are affected by the framing of legal questions). For a 
discussion of these effects on international law, in particular on states’ decisions regarding treaty 
reservations, see Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty 
Design, 53 VA. J. INT’L. L. 309 (2013). See also UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Ryan Goodman et al. eds., 2012) (proposing application of tools from social sciences to human 
rights promotion.) 
 22. Levine & Plott, supra note 17 (finding that casting and sequencing of a meeting agenda 
can determine the outcome of voting). 
 23. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 1 (2008) (terming this use of “nudges” to encourage 
decisionmaking, “choice architecture”). 
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a range of reasonable answers.24 Because of these characteristics, the structure 
and process for decisionmaking in this area can have an outsized effect on the 
resulting decision. 
This Article advances two primary arguments: First, I argue that how a 
legal question arises for the executive shapes the process of decisionmaking 
and thus the substantive outcome, which typically becomes the executive’s 
entrenched position going forward. Second, I contend that within executive 
branch legal decisionmaking, some processes—and thus the interpretation 
catalysts that trigger them—are better suited for certain kinds of 
decisionmaking than are others, and that the results are often predictable. These 
two arguments have wide-ranging implications. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II grounds the discussion in a 
background understanding of the moving gears and levers of executive branch 
lawyering in the fields of national security and international law. This Part 
explains how opportunities arise for legal decisionmaking within the executive, 
and the stickiness of executive decisions once made, and introduces the 
relationship between interpretation catalysts and the executive’s ultimate legal 
positions. It then examines the enormous breadth of legal decisionmakers and 
potential mechanisms for coordination of decisionmaking throughout the 
executive branch. The multiplicity of players and processes for decisionmaking 
in this area increases the potential influence of distinct interpretation catalysts 
in shaping how decisionmaking occurs, and thus the resulting substantive 
outcome. 
Part III then demonstrates the phenomenon and effects of interpretation 
catalysts through the detailed exploration of three unique triggers for executive 
branch legal decisionmaking: defensive litigation, treaty-body reporting, and 
speechmaking. It explores the role of each catalyst in shaping the process, 
players, and contextual pressures of legal decisionmaking, and thus its 
distinctive influence on the ultimate substantive position taken by the 
executive. In revealing the diverse and often predictable effects of distinct 
interpretation catalysts on executive decisionmaking, Part III also explores the 
relative influence of each catalyst and its predisposition toward different types 
of decisions. 
A comparison of the effects of distinct interpretation catalysts on 
decisionmaking—and the propensity of each toward different results—
demonstrates that different catalysts are more or less suited to different kinds of 
decisions. Factors such as the level of coordination, the time permitted for 
reflection, or the status of the officials involved exert a significant influence on 
the shape of the resulting decision—including whether it is likely to entrench or 
challenge the status quo—and are heavily influenced by the interpretation 
catalysts that trigger the decisionmaking process. Part IV illustrates this 
phenomenon through a case study involving the Bush Administration’s 2005-
2006 report to the monitoring committee of the Convention Against Torture. 
 
 24. See infra Section II.B. 
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The interpretation catalyst phenomenon has wide-ranging implications for 
scholars, advocates, courts, and the executive itself. Part V surveys a selection 
of these implications. It addresses ongoing debates about executive power and 
constraint that would benefit from wrestling with the influence of interpretation 
catalysts on executive decisionmaking. This Part also explores the implications 
of interpretation catalysts for private advocates, who can maximize their efforts 
to challenge executive legal positions and policies by considering which 
pressure points are more or less likely to produce the outcomes that they 
support. Finally, it suggests a rethinking of the current state of judicial 
deference to executive positions in the area of national security and 
international law, in light of the inordinate influence of litigation itself on the 
process and results of executive decisionmaking. 
II. EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEGAL DECISIONMAKING 
Before exploring the operation and effects of specific interpretation 
catalysts on executive legal decisionmaking, some scene-setting is necessary. 
This Part therefore provides background on certain key components of national 
security legal decisionmaking within the executive—in particular the players 
involved, and the way they organize to arrive at decisions—in order to set the 
stage for a deeper exploration of the work of interpretation catalysts in Parts III 
and IV. This Part does not generally proffer conclusions about the nature of 
particular processes, how they differ substantively, or how they are likely to 
shape the resulting decisions. Instead, it provides a necessary backdrop to Part 
III, which turns to a more thorough investigation of distinct interpretation 
catalysts, the role they play in triggering decisionmaking players and 
mechanisms, the distinctive biases and proclivities of the resulting 
decisionmaking processes, and their effects on ultimate executive positions. 
A. What Are Interpretation Catalysts? 
Executive branch decisionmaking typically moves at a glacial pace. 
Significant shifts in the executive’s positions are rare. Legal interpretations are 
particularly sticky; once made (especially when made publicly), they tend to 
become entrenched unless forcefully overturned. This is true for a host of 
reasons, including the deep-seated legal traditions that emphasize precedent and 
consistency as integral to the rule of law,25 as well as the effects of path 
dependence and status quo bias on subsequent decisionmaking, the enormous 
transaction costs of arriving at a decision in the first place, and the resistance of 
government bureaucracy to change.26 
 
 25. See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1448, 1494-95 (2010) (discussing the role of precedent and the values of “consistency and 
predictability in the law”). 
 26. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of 
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 605 (2001) (“[E]arly resolutions of 
legal issues can become locked-in and resistant to change.”); Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 21 
(discussing status quo bias). 
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Nevertheless, windows for novel interpretation or position reversals do 
occur, and the resulting decisions are all the more important because of their 
likely entrenchment.27 Moreover, small-scale questions arise constantly that 
lead to mini-interpretations that over time can develop into significant 
decisions. Attorneys throughout the executive branch—whether employed in 
political or career positions; in agency general counsel offices, the Department 
of Justice, or the White House; as heads of offices or as line attorneys—
confront numerous questions a day that require them to understand, interpret, 
and assert publically or internally the government’s legal position on a 
particular issue.28 
Interpretation catalysts, as identified and defined by this Article, are the 
triggering events that impel the executive—or any institution—to consider, 
determine, and assert, whether publicly or not, a position on a matter of legal 
interpretation. Interpretation catalysts exist in many forms,29 three of which I 
wrestle with in Part III. Interpretation catalysts may be clear-cut distinct 
events—for example, a request for legal guidance by an executive official who 
desires to use force against a specific target. Or they can also include a complex 
array of triggers that together compel an executive position, such as a lawsuit 
challenging that executive action, in which executive officials must assert a 
broad legal position on a matter, some piece of which had previously been 
considered internally.30 Moreover, interpretation catalysts can involve external 
triggers—such as a treaty body requesting a report on a state’s compliance;31 
internal triggers—such as the above request for legal guidance by an executive 
official; or a mix of these—such as the internal decision by executive officials 
to explain the executive’s position in a speech or other announcement, 
prompted by external calls for transparency.32 
 
 27. See, e.g., JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 203-04 
(2d ed. 1995) (highlighting the importance of “policy windows” in effecting change); Hathaway, supra 
note 26, at 605 (“Opportunities for significant legal change in a common law system are brief and 
intermittent, occurring during critical junctures when new legal issues arise or higher courts or 
legislatures intercede.”). 
 28. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. 
CT. REV. 201, 202-03 (noting that many agency decisions stem from “relatively informal, ‘non-rulelike,’ 
or decentralized forms of administrative action,” and “not from the central hierarchy of the agency but 
from branch offices or limited subject matter divisions”); David Fontana, Executive Branch Legalisms, 
124 HARV. L. REV. F. 21, 42 (2012), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/forvol126_fontana.pdf 
(explaining the importance of the vast civil service legal bureaucracy, in which “[c]ivil service lawyers 
have the final word on executive branch law in a large number of situations”). 
 29. Interpretation catalysts in matters of national security can be: (1) adjudication-driven 
(including both domestic and international litigation, as well as administrative processes); (2) future-
action or policy-driven (e.g., a proposal by government officials to use force to target an individual or 
object, or the establishment of administrative procedures for detainees); (3) event-driven (e.g., an 
upcoming conference, speech, or testimony before Congress); (4) soft law-driven (e.g., treaty body 
reporting processes and resolutions); and (5) hard law-driven (e.g., bilateral and multilateral treaty 
negotiations, U.N. Security Council Resolutions, and responses to legislation). 
 30. See infra Section III.A. 
 31. See infra Section III.B. 
 32. See infra Section III.C. 
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Interpretation catalysts not only prompt new questions; they can also 
operate as action-forcing events for matters that are otherwise moving along 
cautiously or might otherwise have been left dormant.33 Moreover, matters 
under discussion in one process may, by virtue of a particularly forceful 
interpretation catalyst, shift suddenly into another.34 Litigation is an 
interpretation catalyst that—due to factors such as time pressure, external 
enforcement, and the potential for significant concrete consequences—tends to 
take precedence over other catalysts. 
When interpretation catalysts arise, the unique nature of the particular 
trigger involved shapes the resultant legal decisionmaking process within the 
executive.35 Each interpretation catalyst starts the decisionmaking process from 
a distinct point within the bureaucracy and in a context tailored to that 
particular trigger. The initial catalyst affects not only the identity of the initial 
actor who responds to that trigger, but also the identity of the relevant 
government actors who participate in the resultant process, and their relative 
status, influence, and ultimate authority. It frames the task at hand—including 
whether a legal interpretation or policy decision is required—and it shapes the 
context and the pressures, biases, and interests in light of which the 
decisionmaking proceeds. All of these factors play a critical and potentially 
transformative role in shaping executive decisions; thus the influence of the 
distinct interpretation catalyst on the decisionmaking process grants it 
significant potential to influence the substance of the ultimate—likely 
enduring—executive position. 
B. Disaggregating Decisionmaking 
The importance of the entry point of a decision is due in large part to the 
existence of numerous relevant players—including legal players—within the 
executive who have distinct roles yet who overlap in their substantive interests, 
expertise, and spheres of influence, as well as a variety of mechanisms for 
coordinating decisionmaking. The decisionmaking mechanism, or process, 
employed and the identity and stature of the players involved can have a critical 
impact on the resulting decision, and are heavily informed by the nature of the 
initial interpretation catalyst. 
1. Interpretation Catalysts Empower Different Executive 
Actors 
One of the key effects interpretation catalysts have on executive legal 
interpretation is to influence the identity and authority of the relevant legal 
decisionmakers involved in a given issue. That different “deciders” exist 
 
 33. See infra text accompanying note 189. 
 34. See infra text accompanying notes 75-79. 
 35. See infra Part III. 
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throughout the executive branch should not be a matter of controversy.36 In 
fact, there is an implicit assumption underlying much scholarship on the 
executive that there are varied potential governmental decisionmakers, that 
decisionmaking structures and individual authority can change, and that 
different processes could and do lead to elevation or subordination of different 
decisionmakers,37 and thus to different results.38 This is true even in the realm 
of legal interpretation,39 though the existence of multiple legal deciders may be 
somewhat more disquieting to some. Yet a vast network of lawyers exist 
throughout the executive who proffer legal guidance on a regular basis, who are 
at times called upon to declare those views publicly, who can hold the power to 
speak authoritatively for the U.S. government on matters of legal interpretation 
and policy and whose command over a matter can rise or fall depending on the 
operating organizational structure. 
Much scholarship on executive branch decisionmaking—including both 
administrative law scholarship40 and literature on executive legal 
interpretation41—at least implicitly recognizes that the President is not always 
the ultimate decider. This is an understatement. The President is almost never 
the decider on the vast majority of decisions that take place throughout the 
executive branch, and this is all the more true in matters of legal 
interpretation.42 In fact, there are literally thousands of lawyers in general 
counsel offices in every agency who play an enormous role in the daily and 
long-term formulation of policy and legal interpretation,43 and decisions are 
made on a near constant basis by cabinet-level heads of agencies, by politically 
 
 36. ALLISON, supra note 20, at 80 (explaining that the size of organizations “prevents any 
single central authority from making all important decisions,” and that the important provision of 
“specialized attention to particular facets of problems” has the inherent result that “government leaders 
[cannot simply] cope with the problems themselves”). 
 37. Much administrative law scholarship wrestles with the ideal allocation of authority among 
executive branch officials, thus presuming the existence of multiple deciders whose relative authority 
can shift as a consequence of structural or incentive changes, which in turn can lead to different 
substantive outcomes. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 
(2001) (arguing for heightened Presidential involvement in agency decisionmaking so as to increase, 
inter alia, accountability in the resulting government actions); Neal Katyal, Internal Separation, supra 
note 7; Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 
1059 (2011) (arguing, inter alia, that administrative law jurisprudence determines the relative influence 
of different officials within agencies). 
 38. See, e.g., Barron & Kagan, supra note 28, at 234-35 (noting that “agencies are 
multifaceted organizations, made up of diverse actors with diverse attributes and orientations,” and that 
as “hierarchically structured organizations,” “different levels of actors respond to different constraints 
and incentives, thus making different decisions”). 
 39. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 6; GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR 
PRESIDENCY, supra note 14. 
 40. See supra notes 37-38. 
 41. While emerging scholarship on interagency legal dynamics tends to take a President-
focused view, much scholarship on individual legal offices within the executive contemplates that these 
offices take positions that either do not reach the President or may not align with his preferences. See 
supra notes 7, 12-15, and accompanying text. 
 42. See, e.g., infra Subsection I.B.2 (discussing the limited decisions that reach the President, 
the packaged form in which they do so, and the constraints on his ability to overrule legal decisions). 
 43. See e.g., Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 7, at 1733-34 n.176 (noting the incredible 
proliferation of attorneys in agency general counsel offices throughout the executive branch). 
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appointed and Senate-confirmed general counsels, and by both political and 
career officials at lower levels throughout the government bureaucracy.44 These 
officials communicate and coordinate across agencies and components of their 
agencies at all levels of hierarchy, and thus even those decisions that involve 
significant interagency interaction may never reach the desks of high-level 
people within those very agencies, let alone the White House. Those that do 
have typically been so haggled over by agency officials—handled by White 
House staffers—and are so deeply embedded in the related policy action, that 
when they finally reach the President, the question is rarely “what is your best 
view of the law on this question,” but rather a complex policy choice, often 
including the preferences and guidance of cabinet officials and staffers, with 
possible additional information including the legal risks associated with each.45 
Of course, many of the decisions regarding legal risks and constraints made by 
lower level officials along the way will influence the parameters of the policies 
and options presented, thus playing a huge role in policy formation ex ante.46 
The scenario can also work in reverse: if the President or White House staffers 
are interested in pursuing a policy or action, they may request guidance on their 
legally available options,47 thus acting as an interpretation catalyst from the top 
down. 
Numerous executive branch offices, including the offices of general 
counsel and other components of all relevant national security entities such as 
Defense, State, Justice, and the Intelligence Community, as well as counsel and 
other staff at the White House and National Security Council, play critical roles 
in the national security legal architecture.48 DOJ alone contains several 
intersecting and sometimes competing offices that play key roles in national 
security law and policy, such as the National Security Division, the Office of 
the Solicitor General, the Office of Legal Counsel, and the major trial and 
appellate litigation divisions that represent and defend the executive’s positions 
 
 44. See, e.g., Magill & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 1038 (noting an allocation of “power 
within an agency both horizontally (to different types of decisionmakers at roughly the same level at the 
agency) and vertically (to decisionmakers at varying levels within the agency hierarchy)”). I also use 
“horizontal” to include the disaggregation of decisionmaking throughout the interagency in addition to 
within a given agency. 
 45. See, e.g., JAMES BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE 105-21 (2007) (discussing how NSC-
led meetings and staff serve to frame matters for Presidential decision); Fontana, supra note 28 (noting 
that legal issues typically reach political lawyers only “after civil service lawyers have already framed 
the issue in important ways, and it is difficult to diverge from these civil service framings”); Levine & 
Plott, supra note 17. 
 46. See, e.g., GRAHAM ALLISON & PETER SZANTON, REMAKING FOREIGN POLICY 18 (1977) 
(explaining the limited alternatives presented to the President by analogy to choosing an entrée from the 
menu at a Chinese restaurant: the President has ultimate decision making authority, but is constrained by 
the options presented by his advisers and the rest of the bureaucracy, so no matter what entrée he 
chooses, he’s going to be eating Chinese food, not coq au vin); CHAYES, supra note 14. 
 47. I am grateful for this insight to Trevor Morrison, who provided comments on this Article. 
 48. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 15 (examining the roles and distinct leanings of the State 
Department Office of the Legal Adviser, The Defense Department Office of General Counsel, DOJ 
Office of Legal Counsel, and the National Security Legal Adviser). 
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and programs in the lower courts.49 Each of these offices engages in legal 
interpretation—and decisionmaking generally—from a distinct organizational 
perspective.50 Putting aside the possibility of bad actors, all understand their 
task to be ensuring proper legal guidance to their policy clients and to the 
President. Yet this task and the resulting legal guidance can be highly 
influenced by the role of the particular office and the policy goals of its client.51 
This role can vary dramatically across offices and according to the task at 
hand.52 For example, advice may differ dramatically between an office tasked 
with protecting the executive from litigation risk before action is taken, and one 
that must defend aggressive executive action ex post.53 Particularly when it 
comes to the application of international and domestic law to modern armed 
conflict and security threats, there is often a range of plausible legal 
interpretations. An agency or official’s position on a legal question—even its 
best reading of the law—will understandably vary somewhat according to its 
distinct purpose and focus, among other factors.54 And since national security 
and international law matters by their nature often involve issues of heavily 
overlapping jurisdiction, the tension of competing views among executive 
branch offices and officials is often acutely significant. 
At least with respect to matters on which there is a range of plausible 
views, it should be clear that the relative influence—both as a matter of 
structure and of personality—of a particular individual or office within the 
executive branch can matter a great deal to the executive’s ultimate substantive 
position. Thus the allocation of decisionmaking authority, or even persuasive 
power,55 to different components or individuals within the executive branch can 
have a significant effect on the substantive outcome.56 
 
 49. These include Federal Programs and the Torts branch of the Civil Division, Civil 
Appellate, and individual U.S. Attorney’s offices that prosecute and defend national security cases 
within their individual districts. See infra note 93. 
 50. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Why Public Administration?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & 
THEORY 1, 10 (1998) (highlighting “the importance of organizational loyalty and the processes of 
organizational identification in shaping the behavior of people when they are acting in their 
organizational roles” (footnote omitted)). 
 51. See, e.g., CHAYES, supra note 14, at 30 (“Legal considerations . . . filter[] through the 
different purposes, perspectives, and susceptibilities of the players in the central game.”); Magill & 
Vermeule, supra note 37, at 1037-38 (discussing various types of stakeholders who may exert “decisive 
or crucial authority” over agency action, and who “are likely to disagree, at least sometimes, about the 
right course for the agency” (footnote omitted)); Rao, supra note 15, at 228 (“[E]ach agency has a 
particular culture and institutional interests that shape how it provides legal analysis.”). 
 52. Rao, supra note 15, at 228. 
 53. See, e.g., Harold Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 513, 515 (1993) (highlighting the difference in potential impartiality between legal guidance given 
ex ante versus ex post, when the lawyer would be “locked into a position by [the] client’s action and 
forced to . . . justify[] that action after the fact”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN 
SYSTEMS 278-79 (1981) (“[P]ositions are filled by persons, and persons possess diverse and variable 
characteristics, some of which may become the basis for informal power differences in formal 
organizations.”). 
 56. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY, supra note 14; SCHARF & WILLIAMS, 
supra note 12, at 192-93 (quoting Legal Adviser William Taft as stating that had the Legal Advisor been 
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2. Interpretation Catalysts Trigger Different Mechanisms for 
Decisionmaking 
Considering this multitude of deciders within the executive and the 
inevitability of disagreement among them, how does the executive ever arrive 
at a position? In fact, diverse mechanisms exist throughout the executive for 
coordinating and corralling decisionmaking. These distinct methods of 
decisionmaking determine the forum in which decisionmaking will occur, the 
method of coordination and where the ultimate decisionmaking authority will 
lie. Thus, different mechanisms elevate and empower different sets of actors, 
and affect the contextual pressures emphasized, the interests prioritized, and the 
formality of decisionmaking authority. These different mechanisms for 
coordination click into gear depending on the interpretation catalyst that 
triggers the decisionmaking process. For example, the filing of a lawsuit 
against the United States will trigger a litigation-coordination mechanism for 
determining the executive’s legal position and response. 
Mechanisms for coordination of decisionmaking take many forms. 
Legislation or executive orders may delegate formal structural coordinating or 
decisionmaking authority to a task force or given office, such as National 
Security Council (NSC)-led working groups and committees.57 In other cases 
mechanisms for coordination and ultimate decider status may arise organically, 
such as the SG-led process for gathering agency views and reaching a litigation 
position.58 Who decides a given question may be linked to who has “the pen” 
on that issue, or whose agency intends to take an action or enforce a particular 
policy.59 If a U.S. military commander is making an urgent capture decision in 
the field, questions regarding the executive’s detention authority under the laws 
of war will likely take a different path up through the government (and they 
 
involved in the legal work involving treatment of detainees, “several conclusions that were not 
consistent with our treaty obligations under the Convention against Torture and our obligations under 
customary international law would not have been reached”). Of course, there are some issues—of which 
this may be an example—where high-level officials (including the President) are sufficiently involved 
and invested in a given result so as to make the particular process followed carry less weight. See M. 
Elizabeth Magill, Can Process Cure Substance? A Response to Neal Katyal’s “Internal Separation of 
Powers,” 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 126, 130 (2006), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/73.pdf 
(arguing that “the Bush Administration’s post-September 11 legal decisions [were not] the result of a 
failed process,” rather “the Administration’s decision-makers were aware of the opposing arguments but 
adopted the course that they did despite those objections”). 
 57. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 45, at 107-08, 116-19 (describing NSC-run Principals and 
Deputies Committee Meetings as the principle “interagency for[a] for consideration of policy issues 
affecting national security,” which “frame issues for presidential consideration or resolve issues that do 
not require presidential decision,” as well as informal mechanisms for National Security Advisor-run 
high level meetings); Robert Chesney, Podcast Episode #8: Brigadier General Richard Gross on the 
Role of the Legal Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, LAWFARE (Apr. 9, 2012, 2:23 
PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/04/lawfare-podcast-episode-8-brigadier-general-richard-gross   
-on-the-role-of-the-legal-advisor-to-the-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff (discussing NSC-led 
meetings, in addition to “Lawyers Group” meetings run by the National Security Legal Adviser). 
 58. See infra Section III.A.  
 59. See, e.g., Stephen Preston, Remarks at Harvard Law School: CIA and the Rule of Law 
(Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/04/remarks-of-cia-general-counsel-stephen-preston  
-at-harvard-law-school/#more-6709 (explaining the process for legal decisionmaking in areas where the 
CIA has the lead). 
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may not get very far up even within the individual’s immediate chain of 
command), than similar questions arising in Guantánamo habeas litigation in 
federal courts, where DOJ litigators must make public representations in briefs 
that are vetted throughout the interagency, but on which DOJ—not DOD—has 
final authority.60 
OLC, for its part, takes on a critical role in coordinating and settling legal 
interpretation for the executive in certain contexts. This intimate office of 
twenty or so attorneys61 is unusual in many ways, not the least of which are the 
formal legal opinions its attorneys produce, which are generally considered 
binding on the relevant components of the executive.62 Yet OLC has significant 
constraints on its involvement in decisionmaking. First, while OLC has 
developed an expertise in strict legal interpretation, questions of legal policy 
may be ill-suited to the office.63 Moreover, outside of certain specific matters,64 
OLC’s authority depends on agencies’ willingness to turn to the office for 
guidance.65 Agencies may choose to do so for a number of reasons, including to 
seek heightened legitimacy and broader accountability—even political or legal 
cover—for controversial policies or actions.66 But there are many reasons 
 
 60. See, e.g., infra Subsection III.A.2.c. 
 61. OLC is run by a political appointee and staffed by several political deputies and career 
attorneys, many of whom turn over with some regularity. There exists some debate over whether the 
office is properly characterized as predominantly “career” or political. See, e.g., Cornelia T.L. Pillard, 
The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 703 (2005) 
(arguing that OLC is “staffed largely with career lawyers whose principal credentials are their legal 
skills, and have tended to foster within their own legal cultures a distinction between politics and law”); 
Rao, supra note 15, at 244 (arguing that this “structure of OLC allows for a significant degree of 
political control over the office”). 
 62. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 2877 (May 31, 1918), reprinted in WASH. GOV’T PRINTING 
OFFICE, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT AND AMENDMENTS THERETO 48 (1920) (“[A]ny opinion or 
ruling by the Attorney General upon any question of law . . . shall be treated as binding upon all 
departments, bureaus, agencies or offices therewith concerned.”). But see Herz, supra note 12, at 171 
n.13 (suggesting that “uncertainty reigns as to the present validity of this order” but that the issue “need 
never come to a head” because submission to OLC guidance is voluntary and, “even under EO 2877, 
agencies are not required to submit legal questions to the attorney general”). 
 63. See, e.g., Pillard, supra note 61, at 704. 
 64. Certain matters such as pending legislation and executive orders almost always pass 
through the OLC for legal advice and approval. See Office of Legal Counsel: General Functions, 28 
C.F.R. § 0.25 (2010); Office of Leg. Counsel, About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/olc (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). Other matters may, due to their substance, carry 
an expectation of OLC involvement. See Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 7, at 1732-33 (“[Q]uestions 
that should ordinarily go to OLC . . . cover (1) legal issues that OLC has a history of addressing and on 
which it therefore has an accumulated jurisprudence and expertise; (2) significant issues of executive 
power; and (3) programs or policies likely to trigger substantial public attention and/or controversy.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 12, at 161. Herz notes that while OLC gives  
a binding legal opinion to an agency . . . [i]n a relative handful of cases, . . . this fact hardly 
means that the department controls legal advice-giving. Most importantly, it cannot insist on 
giving an opinion on a question of law facing the agency; the agency must come to it. As a 
result, the agency holds its own counsel on the huge majority of legal issues, without advice 
from the OLC.  
Id.; see also Pillard, supra note 61, at 713 (“Nobody is required to seek a legal opinion from OLC. Each 
potential client agency, department, or office has its own lawyers and they are free to resolve issues, 
including constitutional issues, on their own.”). 
 66. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY, supra note 14, at 96-97 (explaining that 
OLC opinions can offer “legal cover” for officials who fear prosecution for risky actions and policies, 
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agencies may not wish to seek OLC advice. Not least among them are the 
following: they might not like the answer they expect to receive from OLC,67 or 
they may not wish to subordinate the decisions of their own agency officials to 
those of OLC attorneys.68 To date OLC plays a considerable role in executive 
legal interpretation, but this office has structural and substantive constraints on 
how much it can address and control, the ways legal decisions come to it and its 
ability to weigh in or direct decisionmaking, and its expertise relative to the 
agency lawyers who regularly operate in given fields; it thus complements but 
does not displace or control the vast universe of legal decisionmaking that 
occurs daily throughout the executive bureaucracy.69 
Decisionmaking mechanisms often are not set in stone and authority can 
evolve over time or change with new administrations as they issue new 
regulations and executive orders. This potential for fluctuation has at times 
resulted in turf battles between the agencies over legal interpretation. For 
example, DOJ has sparred repeatedly with the State Department’s Office of 
Legal Adviser (L) over control of international law interpretation and 
representation,70 leading at times to intervention by White House staff and even 
on occasion by the President himself.71 Some can be explained by true 
 
because OLC opinions are “effectively an advance pardon for actions taken at the edges of vague 
criminal laws”); Morrison, Libya, supra note 7, at 63 (“When OLC concludes that a government action 
is lawful, its conclusion carries a legitimacy that other executive offices cannot so readily provide.”). 
 67. In fact, OLC is sometimes asked not to prepare a formal opinion on a matter. See, e.g., 
Pildes, supra note 8, at 1399 (noting that “one will never see an OLC memo reaching th[e] 
conclusion . . . [that] Congress did have the constitutional power to” constrain the President’s wartime 
authority in an “unprecedented” manner, because “[t]he White House would neither need nor want” 
such a memo); Pillard, supra note 61, at 716-17 (stating that “the more critically OLC examines 
executive conduct, the more cautious its clients are likely to be in some cases about seeking its advice”; 
thus OLC’s reliance for its jurisdiction on decisions being brought to it by “the potential objects of 
constitutional (or statutory) constraint” themselves dilutes its power as a constraining force). 
 68. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 12, at 161. 
 69. The OLC, too, may be overruled by the President, though such an act would be 
“exceedingly rare,” and the structure of the relationship and its public image make that a significant 
decision for any President. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal 
Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1577-78 (2007) (explaining that “OLC’s legal 
interpretations typically are considered binding within the executive branch, unless overruled by the 
attorney general or the President (an exceedingly rare occurrence)”). 
 70. See, e.g., The Attorney General’s Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 6 Op. 
O.L.C. 47, 61 (1982) (noting a dispute between DOJ and L over representation of the United States 
before the International Court of Justice, and asserting the Attorney General’s authority over both 
domestic and international litigation); SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 52-54, 57 (quoting former 
Legal Advisers Robert B. Owens’s and Davis R. Robinson’s discussions of L-DOJ turf battles over 
interpretation of treaties and customary international law, as well as ICJ litigation). 
 71. See, e.g., Memorandum from Edwin Meese III, Counselor to the President, to the Sec’y of 
State, and the Sec’y of Treasury, (Feb. 19, 1982) [hereinafter Memorandum from Edwin Meese] (“The 
President, being aware of relevant facts and having considered the stated positions and arguments urged 
by the Attorney General and by the Secretary of State, has concluded that for foreign policy reasons the 
best interests of the United States require that the Secretary of State, subject to the President’s 
prerogative, will continue to designate agents to represent the United States and will continue to control 
proceedings before international tribunals. The President is aware of the Attorney General’s practice of 
providing assistance to the Secretary when requested in particular proceedings before international 
tribunals, and approves such practice.”); see also Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 7, at 1738 (discussing 
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s request that President Bush reconsider his reliance on a formal written 
OLC opinion advising that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees did not merit prisoners of war protection 
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difference of opinion over legal substance, such as the L-OLC debate over the 
treatment of detainees in the early years of the Bush Administration.72 Others 
might have more to do with structural concerns, as may have been the case with 
respect to the L-DOJ struggle over control of international litigation during the 
early 1980s.73 
In some cases, a formal mechanism may initially engage, but events or 
actors may intervene to move the process into a different forum. Examples of 
this include the initial White House Counsel-convened and State Department-
led interagency process to determine how to try detainees captured in the 
conflict with al Qaeda, which according to then-National Security Adviser 
Condoleezza Rice’s account was deflected by the press of ongoing events and 
internal power wrangling into a process that circumvented the established 
national security and foreign policy players such as NSC and the State 
Department.74 Likewise, upon taking office, President Obama issued several 
executive orders mandating formal processes to examine, inter alia, the scope 
of the executive’s military detention authority and the detainability of 
individuals held at Guantánamo.75 Yet many of the thorniest legal questions 
were overtaken by the crush of ongoing detainee habeas litigation,76 in which 
the executive was forced to declare views on such critical issues as the lawful 
scope of military detention in the instant conflict, procedures for review of 
detainees, the nature of the “enemy” groups with whom it was at war, and even 
the geographic and temporal scope of the conflict.77 Thus the Administration’s 
positions on some of the most important legal questions of the current conflict 
were largely formed not through the task forces designed to address them but 
through the litigation coordination process.78 In contrast, statements by 
 
under the Geneva Conventions and the fact that White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales “went out of his 
way to stress that ‘OLC’s interpretation of this legal issue is definitive’”). 
 72. See supra note 56. 
 73. See Memorandum from Edwin Meese, supra note 71.  
 74. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, NO HIGHER HONOR 104-06 (2011). 
 75. Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
 76. Deadlines in the then-continued military commissions cases also likely affected reforms of 
the military commissions system. See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
Statement of President Barack Obama on Military Commissions (May 15, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2009/05/15/us/politics/15obama.text.html. 
 77. See, e.g., Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority 
Relative to the Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 577 F. 
Supp. 2d 312 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 08-442) [hereinafter March 13 Brief] http://www.justice.gov/opa 
/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf (asserting the Obama Administration’s revised standard for detention 
authority of individuals detained at Guantánamo). Reports suggest that the President took an unusual 
level of interest in this initial March 13 brief, thus altering the typical litigation dynamic. Yet, as Daniel 
Klaidman notes, litigation subverted the forum in which this initial decision would be made. DANIEL 
KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE SOUL OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 58-
60 (2012) (trumpeting the President’s role in the March 13 brief and discussing the driving pressure of 
litigation, yet glossing over areas of significant continuity from the prior Administration’s legal 
position). Moreover, hundreds of subsequent filings in the Guantanamo habeas cases—which the 
President could not monitor—addressed and disposed of many significant legal questions. See, e.g., 
Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (addressing the reach of detention authority to an 
individual who had been apprehended in Bosnia, far from a traditional “hot” battlefield). 
 78. See KLAIDMAN, supra note 77. 
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government officials suggest that the Obama Administration significantly 
restructured the decisionmaking process regarding certain decisions to use 
force, in particular targeted killing, in the conflict with al Qaeda, including 
ensuring that such decisions would be made only at the highest levels.79 These 
examples demonstrate that diverse deciders and processes have existed over 
time, and that Presidents and other actors can and do change the structure of 
legal interpretation to some extent in order to seek better or different 
substantive outcomes, but that external events and other interpretation catalysts 
can play an aggressive role in radically altering the shape of the 
decisionmaking process. 
At the highest levels, meetings of cabinet secretaries or their deputies—
typically called Principals Committees or Deputies Committees—can be called 
to coordinate and decide matters, or to tee up a final decision for the 
President.80 Typically these will be questions of policy and not strict legal 
interpretation, though legal decisions and considerations will certainly inform 
and constrain the policy options. Yet few decisions reach this level, and when 
they do they arrive in a packaged form, interwoven with multiple 
considerations, which frames the available choices.81 Similarly, in any of these 
mechanisms, the President may step in to overrule the decision of an agency or 
of other advisers, with varying consequences depending on the circumstances, 
the nature of the dispute, and the temperament of the relevant officials 
(including willingness to resign or leak information).82 But this is almost 
always unrealistic as a practical matter. For the President to weigh in on an 
issue, it requires first and foremost that it be brought to his attention and in a 
sufficiently timely matter. Yet it is unlikely the President himself is even aware 
of the vast majority of the legal decisions that occur regularly throughout the 
executive. Moreover, if the matter comes to the President not as a neutral 
choice among options but rather as a question whether to “overrule” the 
decision of one of his cabinet members or advisers, this very form has an 
impact on the outcome and the weight given to that particular decision.83 And 
even when a matter does come before a President who then signs off on one 
proposal over another, how and to what extent this decision is interpreted and 
then implemented depends once again on multiple layers of bureaucratic 
 
 79. See, e.g., John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, The Efficacy and Ethics of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012), 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy (noting the 
evolution in the Administration’s procedures and standards with respect to targeted killings, which are 
now “evaluated by the very most senior officials in our government for decision”); KLAIDMAN, supra 
note 77, at 42-43. 
 80. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 45, at 107-08, 116-19 (describing NSC-run Principles and 
Deputies Committee meetings as the principal “interagency for[a] for consideration of policy issues 
affecting national security,” which “frame issues for presidential consideration or resolve issues that do 
not require presidential decision,” as well as informal mechanisms for National Security Advisor-run 
high level meetings (citations omitted)). 
 81. See supra notes 45-46. 
 82. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY, supra note 14. 
 83. See, e.g., Morrison, Libya, supra note 7, at 68-69. 
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players who may or may not share the exact vision of the President or 
understanding of his intent.84 
*     *     * 
Decisionmaking processes vary dramatically across a range of factors, 
and each promotes different types of decisions. As this Article will explore in 
Parts III and IV, some interpretation catalysts trigger processes that focus on 
consensus; others promote unitary deciders. Some permit extensive reflection; 
others demand immediate decisions. Some tend to engage high-level officials 
while others empower career bureaucrats. Some further entrench the status quo 
while others are more conducive to change. All of these factors are predictable 
according to the interpretation catalyst and resulting decisionmaking 
mechanism at issue, and will heavily influence the ultimate executive position. 
Understanding how these catalysts operate is thus essential to comprehending 
executive action or influencing an administrative agenda. 
How a given legal decisionmaking process is triggered, and the 
distinctive pressures, players, and likely influences that come along with it, are 
addressed in the following Part, which examines these phenomena through the 
exploration of three distinct interpretation catalysts. 
III. THE ROLE OF INTERPRETATION CATALYSTS IN SHAPING EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH LEGAL DECISIONMAKING 
Interpretation catalysts come in many forms. They can trigger quite 
specific, narrowly-tailored questions: can DOD lawfully use military force to 
target this individual in Pakistan? They can also involve broad, open-ended 
hypotheticals, such as a White House request to determine the scope of options 
legally available to the President on a given matter. They may trigger guidance 
that is more or less formal; that is public or secret; that can involve mere 
flagging of legal risk or clear establishment of legal boundaries; or that may 
promote legal policy that is informed by law but does not necessarily require 
formal legal decisions. 
This Part explores in detail three key interpretation catalysts—defensive 
litigation, the treaty-body reporting process, and speechmaking—in order to 
illustrate the effect of catalysts on internal executive processes and players. 
This list is not intended to be exhaustive and represents only a fraction of the 
countless interpretation catalysts that regularly impel executive action.85 
Because of the difficulty in assessing secret or simply informal legal 
interpretation—indeed, legal guidance often heads off policy options at such an 
 
 84. A classic anecdote recalls President Harry Truman’s prediction of then General Dwight 
Eisenhower’s adjustment to the Presidency: “He’ll sit here, . . . and he’ll say, ‘Do this! Do that!’ And 
nothing will happen. Poor Ike—it won’t be a bit like the Army. He’ll find it very frustrating.” PETER W. 
RODMAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMMAND: POWER, LEADERSHIP, AND THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY 
FROM RICHARD NIXON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 5 (2009). As for his own experience, Truman reflected, “I 
sit here all day trying to persuade people to do the things they ought to have sense enough to do without 
my persuading them. . . . That’s all the powers of the President amount to.” Id. 
 85. See supra note 29. 
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early stage that the need does not arise for a final opinion86—this Part focuses 
on three catalysts that involve both formal crystallization and public 
declaration. By necessity this removes some interesting variables from our 
study—for example, we cannot assess here the effect secrecy has on 
decisionmaking.87 Nevertheless, sufficient differences remain between these 
public examples of interpretation catalysts to illustrate the phenomenon. And 
one can hypothesize that a broadening of the exercise to examine the full range 
of legal decisionmaking—in particular the addition of variables such as level of 
transparency and formality of guidance—would only heighten, rather than 
weaken, the interpretation catalyst effect. 
This Part will examine the unique nature of each catalyst according to the 
following metrics, which can dramatically shape the ultimate decision: the 
effect of the catalyst on which component of the executive or type of official 
takes the lead on decisionmaking; its effect on the mechanisms for coordination 
employed; and the contextual pressures and distinctive utility of each catalyst. 
A. The Defensive Litigation Catalyst 
Filing a lawsuit against the government has historically been a natural 
means by which to challenge executive action or policies. Defensive litigation 
in U.S. courts is therefore a particularly significant catalyst driving the 
executive regularly to state its legal position publicly on matters of national 
security. It has a variety of important effects on the executive; it may serve to 
bring matters into the public view, to prompt policy change, or to force the 
executive branch to crystallize its views publicly. But contrary to conventional 
wisdom, which holds that it is also a means of pushing the executive to confess 
error and accept legal obligations,88 in the area of national security, defensive 
litigation is not often an effective means of binding the executive branch to a 
more constrained interpretation of its legal authority. In fact, for reasons 
explored in the following sections, the contrary is often true. 
With some critical exceptions over the course of the last decade89—
notable mainly for their rarity—U.S. courts tend to defer broadly to the 
 
 86. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 8, at 1398-1400 (arguing that constraining opinions may 
inform decisions but are unlikely to be formalized). 
 87. See, e.g., Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 7, at 1730 (suggesting that secret opinions more 
easily permit politicized advice on high-priority matters). Certainly notorious examples exist of 
formerly-secret, aggressive lawyering. But, as Pildes notes, we are unlikely ever to see the many 
examples of secret, constraining lawyering. Pildes, supra note 8, at 1398-1400. Nevertheless it might be 
revealing to study historical examples of legal guidance that eventually came to light despite their 
intended nondisclosure, though even this sample would be skewed toward decisions that were 
formalized in writing and thus might not sufficiently include the kind of constraining advice Pildes 
suggests often goes unmemorialized. 
 88. See, e.g., Pillard, supra note 61, at 709. 
 89. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (extending the writ of habeas corpus 
to aliens detained at Guantánamo); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (defining the conflict 
with al Qaeda as a non-international armed conflict to which Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions would apply, contrary to the prior stated position of the U.S. government). 
INGBER DRAFT 12 7.25.13 (FINAL PROOF).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/25/13  3:59 PM 
2013] Interpretation Catalysts 379 
  
executive in areas of wartime authority, foreign policy, and national security.90 
This means that the executive’s interpretation of its legal authority in a given 
case—where it may be called upon to craft its position in the course of that 
litigation—is given enormous weight and often becomes the law of the land. 
Yet the impact of litigation on the ex ante executive legal decisionmaking 
process cannot be overstated. This impact is particularly salient when when the 
government or government officials are a defensive party to the suit.91 Once the 
government is implicated in a lawsuit, particularly over a matter of national 
security, nearly all forces align to push the executive to advocate an expansive 
view of its own authority, to defend past action, and to request a judgment in 
favor of the government on the broadest possible grounds so as to preserve 
executive flexibility to the greatest possible extent. 
1. Who Has the Pen? 
A critical effect of litigation on legal interpretation within the U.S. 
government is its influence on the players involved and their stature at the 
decisionmaking table. As this section shows, litigation has a radical effect on 
decisionmaking authority. It shifts authority among agencies—toward DOJ and 
away from the client agencies whose policies may be at stake. And it shifts 
authority within DOJ itself, toward the litigating components such as the SG’s 
office and the Civil Division, and away from policy offices and OLC. 
Domestic litigation authority is for the most part consolidated today in 
DOJ.92 DOJ itself is made of many components, and which component takes 
the lead on a given issue depends on its substance and the task at hand. The 
Solicitor General not only represents the United States in the Supreme Court, 
but also has authority over whether to pursue appeals in cases lost by the 
government in lower courts, when to intervene or file amicus briefs in all 
appellate courts, and whether and when to defend the constitutionality of 
congressional statutes.93 Responsibility for other national security litigation is 
peppered throughout various offices according to the nature of the case. Thus, 
 
 90. See, e.g., Pillard, supra note 61, at 692 (citing cases). 
 91. A comparison of the executive’s position in defensive cases with those in which it is 
bringing suit or where it or a government official is not a named party would be worth exploring. In the 
interest of brevity this Article focuses on defensive lawsuits. Ingrid Wuerth has noted a potentially 
distinct effect of litigation on executive branch positions in the context of state immunity. See Ingrid 
Wuerth, International Law in Domestic Courts and the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Case, 
13 MELBOURNE J. INT’L LAW 819, 834 (2012) (noting that “executive branches may feel constrained in 
domestic litigation in ways that might not reflect their preferences when they engage in state-to-state 
negotiation”). 
 92. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of 
litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and 
securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the 
Attorney General.”); Herz, supra note 12, at 149 (noting some exceptions to DOJ control but stating 
that, “[f]or all intents and purposes, it is accurate to say that the Department of Justice represents 
executive agencies in court”). The State Department generally controls litigation before international 
tribunals. See Memorandum from Edwin Meese, supra note 71. 
 93. Salokar, supra note 10, at 67-75; Office of Solicitor Gen., About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST. (last visited Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/osg/about-osg.html. 
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while a particular legal question such as the applicability of a human rights 
treaty to detainees at Guantánamo might have relevance for a range of cases, 
the context in which this question arises—for example, whether in a GTMO 
habeas or Bivens case—affects the office that will exercise general control over 
the executive’s position.94 
One of the most significant characteristics of litigation is that the career 
attorneys who are tasked with managing particular cases in practice wield a 
significant amount of authority.95 First, career litigators typically draft the 
briefs, which can itself matter a great deal, particularly when substance turns on 
nuances in language. As with any negotiation, the person drafting the language 
wields authority simply by setting the default against which others must argue. 
Other actors who might wish to challenge particular language therefore find the 
stage already set against them, and they must pick their battles in what they will 
try to change in the brief, what they can live with, and what they will agree to 
compromise, starting from the position of the initial draft crafted by the line 
attorney. The position as drafter affects not only that initial negotiation but all 
subsequent discussions and compromises as well because, more often than not, 
that attorney will be tasked with drafting the language to implement the 
compromise, and thus remains in a position to influence the ultimate position. 
Second, the often crushing timetable of litigation—particularly at the trial 
level—at times simply does not permit extensive negotiation and elevation of 
policy or legal questions to several layers of superiors within the agency. 
Questions may arise on short notice in briefing, and even shorter notice when 
presented by a judge during oral argument. The line attorney must therefore be 
permitted a certain degree of discretion in presenting the government’s position 
to the court. 
Moreover, the unique nature of litigation and the specific expertise as 
well as ethical duties of litigators—who must present themselves in court, may 
risk sanctions for objectionable behavior or frivolous arguments, and interact 
regularly with the trial and appellate judges and thus are best placed to gauge 
the impact that particular arguments might have on the outcome of a case—
provide individual career litigators with a certain measure of institutionalized 
power to stand up to political pressure or scrutiny over their legal positions. 
The power of these individual litigators is potentially greater than that of their 
colleagues in other offices, who do not always have the threat of an adverse 
 
 94. For example, Federal Programs handles Guantánamo habeas litigation and the Torts 
Branch handles damages claims brought by detainees alleging mistreatment. See Civil Division: General 
Functions, 28 C.F.R. § 0.45 (2012) (vesting in the Civil Division responsibility for defense of tort suits 
against the United States and other civil litigation); March 13 Brief, supra note 77. The National 
Security Division itself was created in March 2006 by the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005 to consolidate other offices handling intelligence and counterterrorism 
issues, but does not handle much litigation. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006); National Security Division, 28 C.F.R. § 0.72 
(2012); Nat’l Sec. Div., About the Division, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/nsd/about    
-nsd.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2013). 
 95. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 20, at 27 (noting that “rank-and-file employees” often have 
“a great deal” of “discretionary authority”). 
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judicial decision to use against political interference.96 The anti-politicization 
culture at DOJ that engenders chafing at White House interference also trickles 
down to affect the political appointee-career litigator dynamic as well.97 Of 
course, career attorneys at DOJ are not free from political or supervisory 
control or pressure, but they do benefit from unique institutionalized norms that 
permit the line attorney more authority and discretion than he might otherwise 
have in a different agency or context.98 
2. Mechanisms for Coordination and Decision 
The defensive litigation catalyst is a highly effective trigger of 
decisionmaking within the executive branch that, because of the aggressive, 
externally driven timetable and significant risks involved, tends to trump more 
comprehensive means of coordination. The litigation catalyst can force the 
executive branch to formulate and state a legal interpretation that it otherwise 
might not have resolved internally, or might not have stated publicly; in other 
cases it can change the internal process in which such resolution is already 
taking place, driving it instead into the litigation-coordination forum. 
a. Interagency Engagement on Litigation 
Consolidation of litigating authority in DOJ does not mean that the role of 
other agencies and their respective general counsels (or for that matter the non-
litigating offices of DOJ) ends where litigation begins. Such offices—in 
particular “client” agencies—may have enormous stake in the case at hand. 
Interagency offices relevant to a particular matter continue to play a role in the 
process and may even be asked to help develop the government’s position or 
strategy or to review briefs, though DOJ retains control of the process.99 
Interagency discussion may take a variety of forms. Supreme Court and 
appellate litigation advances on a timetable that generally permits somewhat 
 
 96. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty To Defend, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 507, 540 (2012) (“DOJ embraces norms and traditions that enhance the status and 
autonomy of the Department and its attorneys [allowing them] to see themselves as lawyers for ‘the 
United States . . . and not [for] the particular President who happens to be serving.’” (quoting Maureen 
Mahoney, et. al., Solicitors General Panel on the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1171, 1180 (2006) (comments of Walter E. Dellinger))); Pillard, supra note 61, at 728 (arguing 
that SG and OLC independence derives from judicial involvement). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See, e.g., GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 4 (4th ed. 
2006) (stating that “[t]he Department of Justice makes the decision on litigation strategy, with the 
advice—but not the control—of the client agency”; in contrast to private litigants, “federal government 
entities are ‘captive clients’ who are unable to ‘fire’ the Department of Justice as litigation counsel”); 
Magill & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 1060 (“When a DOJ attorney represents the agency in court, the 
agency (and its general counsel) loses sole control over the arguments it will make and the tactics it will 
pursue in defending or pursuing agency action. Agency officials will instead need to persuade the DOJ 
lawyer that the agency’s views on substantive matters or litigation tactics are correct.”). 
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formal interagency input and deliberation.100 In making decisions regarding 
litigation positions or whether to appeal or seek certiorari in a case, the SG 
tends to solicit written views from the relevant agencies, holds interagency 
meetings to discuss these views, and acts as the ultimate decider in determining 
the government’s course of action.101 
With respect to litigation at the trial level or other initial decisionmaking, 
staff attorneys throughout the relevant agencies may coordinate with DOJ 
litigators both through formal interagency meetings and through less formal 
phone calls and email exchanges over strategy, legal positions, declarations 
from government officials, and even specific language in briefs. To the extent 
any disagreements cannot be resolved at this level, individuals may ask to 
“elevate” a particular issue, meaning they may raise it with superiors within 
their own agencies, or they may request a higher level of scrutiny at DOJ, or 
both. The most important matters—or intractable disagreements—may 
eventually find their way to the SG or the Attorney General.102 And if there are 
significant policies at stake or questions over which the Attorney General 
would like other input (or political cover), he or she may bring the question to 
other Cabinet- or sub-Cabinet-level officials. Nevertheless, as the next two 
sections explore, there are both practical and structural limits to coordination. 
b. Limits to Coordination 
There will always be matters that may be decided by one particular 
official or agency (or some subset of agencies) with limited recourse to other 
actors in the executive. The reasons for this limited recourse may turn on the 
nature of the matter, its significance, already-adjudicated status (perceived or 
actual), the practical reality of time constraints and other pressures, or a simple 
cutting out (intentional or not) of actors outside that agency. Litigation 
decisions often involve combinations of several of these factors. 
First, the intense timetable of litigation alone may obstruct extensive 
coordination. All of the deliberation, elevation, and negotiation discussed above 
must happen in accordance with hard and often very short litigation deadlines. 
Thus, even to the extent a number of agencies may in their view have 
legitimate concerns with a particular litigation position, they may face an uphill 
battle to elevate these concerns to higher-level officials in the race against the 
clock. And it is a clock over which DOJ, as the agency directly holding the pen, 
inherently exercises more control than the other agencies. 
In addition, litigators at DOJ regularly file briefs that follow similar 
language and legal interpretation of a given issue agreed upon by the 
interagency and political superiors for use in prior briefs, but adopted for a new 
 
 100. See, e.g., Devins & Prakash, supra note 96, at 542 (“[T]he Solicitor General makes use of 
a court-like process in which affected agencies submit written analyses and participate in meetings in 
which they ‘advocate’ their position to the Solicitor General.”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See, e.g., Pillard, supra note 61. 
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case or issues. In such a scenario, there may be a decision not to reengage the 
rest of the interagency or DOJ hierarchy either due to an assumption that such 
language would be accepted for all cases going forward, or to a disinclination 
to rehash the arguments leading to the prior compromise. Or there may be an 
assumption by career lawyers that prior clearances and redlines continue to 
apply despite a shuffling in the political players, and therefore a neglect to re-
clear positions before taking them in court. Indeed, practical reasons alone 
make it untenable to engage actors throughout the rest of DOJ and the 
interagency over the drafting of every sentence in every brief that litigators 
might file. Yet it is inevitable that even small exercises of discretion will 
invariably lead to some subset of cases where new interpretations—however 
slight—may be taken, and these micro-positions can over time entrench legal 
positions. 
c. DOJ as Decider 
Moreover, despite often extensive coordination with client agencies over 
litigation positions, if there remain disagreements over how to handle a case, 
DOJ litigators (and formally, the Attorney General) have the final say.103 The 
AG’s litigation authority is delegated to specific litigating offices within DOJ, 
such as OSG,104 the Civil Division105 and other components of DOJ. The SG 
generally exercises ultimate control over matters within his authority, which 
can mean overruling an agency view or resolving a dispute between 
agencies.106 In this and other matters, if a matter is elevated either within DOJ 
or by interagency players, the AG may weigh in personally, though he or she is 
unlikely to interfere in matters under the SG’s authority.107 And once the AG 
makes a final decision about a legal position or choice of appeal, only the 
President may overturn that decision.108 For many reasons, including the 
 
 103. See, e.g., Donald Verrilli, Questions for the Record from Senator Orrin Hatch, submitted 
to the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, at 3 (2011), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov 
/nominations/112thCongressExecutiveNominations/upload/Verrilli-QFRs.pdf (“[T]he Solicitor General 
exercises independence within a framework that recognizes the ultimate authority of the Attorney 
General (and the President)—an authority rarely exercised—to decide what position the United States 
will take in court.”); id. at 7-8 (“In the event agreement cannot be reached, the Attorney General and 
ultimately the President have the final call.” (quoting Paul Clement)). 
 104. Office of the Solicitor General: General Functions, 28 C.F.R. § 0.20 (2012). 
 105. Civil Division: General Functions, 28 C.F.R. § 0.45 (2012). 
 106. See, e.g., Symposium, Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor General of the 
United States, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1, 73 (2003) (statement of former Deputy Solicitor General, now 
Chief Justice, John Roberts) (“[The interagency dispute] was resolved by holding, and this was typical, a 
series of interminable meetings with all interested parties that looked like nothing so much as 
Thanksgiving dinner at a dysfunctional family because—as you rapidly find out—these agencies have a 
long history of sort of squabbling with each other and now they are—it is wrong to view it this way, 
but—before their parents and the parents are going to decide which one gets punished and which one 
gets rewarded. I have always been a little surprised at the prominence of the office in resolving those 
types of decisions.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Pillard, supra note 61, at 724-26 (stating that the AG “delegate[es] to the SG the 
framing of legal positions and, ‘in the ordinary course,’ permit[s] the SG’s views to be dispositive” 
(quoting Role of the Solicitor General, 1 O.L.C. 228, 234 (1977))). 
 108. See supra note 103. 
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natural extra hurdle posed by a need to “overturn” a cabinet member, the 
entrenched culture of independence at DOJ, and the negative political 
repercussions that might follow were a President to be seen as overturning the 
AG on a legal matter, presidential intervention in litigation decisions is 
exceedingly rare.109 
3. Contextual Pressures and Utility of the Litigation Catalyst 
As a structural matter, this Section has already explored the effect 
litigation has of shifting authority within the interagency toward DOJ litigators, 
which in itself can have an impact on substantive decisionmaking. That shift is 
important not only because of the individual personality of the particular 
players involved, but because of the unique contextual pressures of defensive 
litigation and thus the proclivities of the offices constituted to address that 
threat. 
Decisionmaking by any entity in the context of litigation to which it is a 
party is a different animal from decisionmaking on a clean slate, or 
decisionmaking in one of the other fora this Article discusses.110 A single 
individual who suddenly faces a legal challenge in court is bound to engage 
that challenge reactively and defensively. As Elena Kagan and David Barron 
have stated, it is “natural . . . to bunker down when attacked,” and this is true 
“for agencies, no less than any other entities.”111 This is all the more true for 
the litigating arm of DOJ, a massive organization built in part for the purpose 
of defending against such challenges. As a repeat player, DOJ as an institution 
has over time internalized the qualities one takes on when faced with such an 
attack.112 DOJ litigators structure careers around facing litigation challenges 
and formulating litigation positions. They are trained for these decisions, they 
have internalized the standards and they—like all other players in the 
bureaucracy—have adapted to the unique role they perform.113 
 
 109. Id.; Salokar, supra note 10, at 76 (noting that the President “rarely . . . get[s] directly 
involved in government litigation”). To the extent White House staffers are engaged at an earlier stage, 
they may on rare occasions step in to make the views of the White House known. Also, on rare 
occasions DOJ may seek input from the White House, in order to receive sign-off on matters that are 
highly controversial or that implicate important policy considerations. See KLAIDMAN, supra note 77. 
 110. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 53 (explaining that, contrary to legal guidance given before 
action is taken, in matters pending in litigation, the “government’s legal posture is already fixed by the 
adversary process”). 
 111. Barron & Kagan, supra note 28, at 260. 
 112. See, e.g., ALLISON, supra note 20, at 81 (noting that ongoing “[p]rimary responsibility for 
a narrow set of problems encourages parochialism” within organizations, including executive agencies, 
and that as a result they “develop relatively stable propensities concerning operational priorities, 
perceptions, and issues”). 
 113. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 20, at 27 (describing how factors like the situations 
employees encounter and “the array of interests in which their agency is embedded . . . combine to 
produce an organizational culture—a distinctive way of viewing and reacting to the bureaucratic 
world—that shapes [their] discretionary authority”); Fontana, supra note 28 (explaining that civil 
service lawyers are not “neutral technocrats” but rather are likely to assume the proclivities and missions 
of their particular agencies). 
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If the government is a party to litigation, it often finds itself defending 
past action or current policies.114 The litigator—in any context—typically 
arrives at a matter knowing the result he or she must reach; the task is often in 
determining the most persuasive way to get there. The question is not typically, 
“what is the best view of the law,” or even “is there good legal authority for 
taking this action.” Rather, in defensive litigation, the question is generally, 
“Can we reasonably argue that . . . ?”115 The lack of a clean slate itself is of 
course not entirely unique to litigators. Each agency or agency component has a 
different perspective or standard it employs, and most have clients who wish to 
undertake certain actions and therefore do not operate in a vacuum.116 
Litigators typically face the added hurdle of jumping into an issue once the 
action in question has already been taken, and of facing off against a challenge 
to the government and an outside arbitrator. Therefore they are not generally in 
a position to say, “if you do this it will entail significant risk; you should 
strongly reconsider.” Instead they are faced with facts on the ground, and must 
defend them zealously if at all possible.117 
Consider the position taken by the Obama Administration on the viability 
in military commissions of the offense of material support for terrorism: in a 
July 2009 statement to the Senate, then-Assistant Attorney General David Kris 
raised “serious questions as to whether material support for terrorism or 
terrorist groups is a traditional violation of the law of war,” thus rendering it 
inappropriate for trial by military commission.118 Contrast this position with 
that of the government’s position in its Hamdan merits brief, signed by Kris’s 
replacement, Lisa Monaco, which—in defending the validity of Hamdan’s 
military commission conviction—argues that material support “has long 
constituted a violation of the U.S. common law of war, [and] should subject the 
 
 114. See, e.g., Barron & Kagan, supra note 28, at 258 (arguing that the executive will ratify an 
earlier agency decision “in almost any case that comes before a court”); Pillard, supra note 61, at 740 
(“[T]he SG ordinarily presses plausible cases or arguments in support of governmental prerogative, 
without regard to whether the Constitution might be better understood to require more restraint.”). It is 
perhaps for these reasons that courts generally decline to award Chevron deference to post-hoc litigation 
positions of the executive that were not established by the agency beforehand. Pillard, supra note 61, at 
740 n.201; see also Magill & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 1042 (“[A]gency action can be upheld, if at 
all, only on the rationale the agency itself articulated when taking action. . . . [A]gencies may not 
employ ‘post hoc rationalizations’ offered during litigation to save an action whose original rationale is 
untenable.”). 
 115. See supra note 114. 
 116. As current and former executive officials have noted, government lawyers are influenced 
by their role and clients’ interests; in fact, a large role of a government lawyer is to find legal 
justification for a client’s position to the extent possible. See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War: 
Presidential Power and the Use of Military Force, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 109-10 (1995). 
 117. See, e.g., Pillard, supra note 61, at 714-15 (noting that the SG’s institutional role of 
“examin[ing] potential constitutional problems only after challenged government action is already a fait 
accompli . . . create[s] incentives for the SG to interpret the Constitution to permit [the action], in order 
to facilitate his defense of the conduct in court—incentives that OLC [or presumably other executive 
actors] would not face when considering the issue in advance of [the action in question]”). 
 118. Military Commissions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 111th Cong. 
(2009), http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/July/Kris%2007-07-09.pdf (statement of 
David Cris, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
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offender to trial and punishment by military commission.”119 A panel of the 
D.C. Circuit overturned Hamdan’s conviction based on the faulty material 
support charge.120 Nevertheless, the government has continued to press the 
argument in a related case,121 allegedly even over the objections of the Military 
Commissions chief prosecutor, who declined to sign the briefs and 
recommended withdrawal of related charges in the 9/11 cases.122 In fact, the 
contrast between that prosecutor’s discretionary123 and strategic consideration 
over which charges to bring—even in an unquestionably more significant 
case—on the one hand, and DOJ’s decision over whether to continue to defend 
an already completed conviction well illustrates the distinctive pressures of 
defensive litigation.124 
Critical decision points arise at all stages of litigation, including at its 
very outset, as in the decision whether to defend a particular act or policy in the 
first place. For example, when federal employees are named as defendants in 
damages cases, the Torts Branch of the DOJ Civil Division typically handles 
 
 119. Brief for the United States at 18, Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(No. 11-1257), 2012 WL 126259. 
 120. Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012). If that decision sticks, this will 
be an example of a rare government loss that in principle constrains the executive’s legal position. Its 
practical effect is less clear, as the decision applies by its terms only to legacy cases for actions taken 
prior to the 2006 MCA. Id. Moreover, Hamdan himself was long ago released, and other detainees with 
charges pending will likely remain at Guantánamo as law-of-war detainees even if they are not charged 
and convicted in a military commission. Ironically, Hamdan may have in fact benefited from his 
conviction on the faulty material support grounds; had he not be convicted and sentenced to a specific 
term of years, and thus released at the end of that term, he might still remain at Guantánamo as a law-of-
war detainee. 
 121. Supplemental Brief for United States, Al Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324, 2013 WL 
122618 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 2013), ECF No. 66; Petition of the United States for Rehearing En Banc, Al 
Bahlul, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2013), ECF No. 69 (arguing, in a case involving the military 
commission conviction of a different Guantanamo detainee on charges implicated by the Hamdan 
decision—inter alia, material support for terrorism and conspiracy to commit war crimes—that the 
panel’s decision in Hamdan was incorrect and should be reconsidered). On Apr. 23, 2013, the court 
granted the United States’s petition for rehearing en banc, and oral argument is scheduled to be heard in 
September 2013. See also Order, Al Bahlul, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 23, 2013), ECF No. 72.  
 122. Charlie Savage, US To Press Fight of Detainee’s Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2013, at 
A14 (stating that the chief prosecutor of the military commissions system “urged the Justice Department 
to drop the case and pointedly did not sign the . . . brief”); Benjamin Wittes, Podcast Episode #23: Brig. 
Gen. Mark Martins on His Decision To Drop Standalone Conspiracy Charges Against 911 Defendants, 
LAWFARE (Jan. 10, 2013, 1:48 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/01/the-lawfare-podcast-episode 
-23-brig-gen-mark-martins-on-his-decisision-to-drop-standalone-conspiracy-charges-against-911-defendants. 
 123. In this particular example, prosecutorial discretion is limited by the commission’s 
distinctive structure, and the convening authority for military commissions declined to dismiss the 
charge. See Press Release, Dep’t of Defense, Convening Authority for Military Commissions Declines to 
Withdraw Conspiracy Charge Against Alleged 9/11 Co-Conspirators Pending Appellate Ruling (Jan.18, 
2013), http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15779. 
 124. Although the Hamdan and Bahlul cases are not purely defensive litigation, in that 
government prosecutors chose initially to bring the prosecutions, the cases are nonetheless in a defensive 
posture at the appellate stage, as executive officials must choose whether and how to defend challenges 
to their convictions and to charges initially brought and framed by a politically-charged office under a 
prior administration. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, No, General Martins Has Not “Gone Rogue,” 
LAWFARE (Jan. 27, 2013, 8:56 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/01/no-general-martins-has-not  
-gone-rogue/ (noting the distinction between Martins’s role in “tactical” decisionmaking “with respect to 
prospective prosecutions” in contrast to “the Justice Department’s function with respect to completed 
ones”). 
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the litigation.125 DOJ’s decision to defend the individual is not automatic, but 
the stakes are high. A decision not to defend a government official for actions 
taken while in their official capacity can send powerful signals, not only to that 
individual but to other officials, about the government’s willingness or ability 
to support their actions. Such a decision may also face intense pressure from 
the official’s home agency, which may view a refusal to defend as an 
indictment of its own activities by DOJ. Thus while “[a] federal employee may 
retain counsel at his own expense, [] this is rarely done.”126 Yet DOJ 
representation means that “the DOJ attorney assigned to defend the employee 
enters into a ‘full and traditional attorney client relationship.’”127 Along with 
that representation comes a zealous defense by DOJ,128 and an understanding 
that this individual’s defense is “in the interest of the United States.”129 
It is precisely this combination of the duty of zealous defense of a client 
with the responsibility of speaking on behalf of the United States that makes 
the decision to defend so critical. For example, despite President Obama’s 
ardent campaign against the interrogation and detention policies of the Bush 
administration, the new Obama Administration nevertheless found itself in the 
early months of 2009 defending former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and ten 
senior military officers against allegations of torture, religious desecration and 
other abuse, in a case brought by former Guantánamo detainees.130 Zealous 
defense in that case meant that—despite candidate Obama’s description of 
Bush-era policies as an “attempt to create a legal black hole at 
Guantánamo”131—the new Administration would continue to argue that at the 
time of the defendants’ alleged acts, it was not clearly established that the 
Constitution protected detainees at Guantánamo,132 and that courts should not 
imply a remedy for constitutional violations in the contexts of “military, 
national security, and foreign affairs matters that are the exclusive province of 
the political branches.”133 Yet it is entirely plausible that had the executive 
determined the reach of constitutional rights to Guantánamo in the aftermath of 
 
 125. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 4, Ch. 4-5.100, http://www.justice.gov 
/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title4/5mciv.htm (“The Constitutional and Specialized Torts 
Staff . . . represent[s] . . . federal employees sued, subpoenaed or charged for actions taken within the 
scope of their employment.”); see Paul Michael Brown, Personal Liability Tort Litigation Against 
Federal Employees, 58 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL. No. 6, at 1 (2010). 
 126. Brown, supra note 125, at 1. 
 127. Id. at 2. 
 128. For discussion of the applicability of the duty of zealous defense to government lawyers, 
see Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government 
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951 (1991). 
 129. Brown, supra note 125, at 1. 
 130. See Suplemental Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 563 F.3d 527 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (Nos. 06-5209, 06-5222) WL 700175, at *8 (Nos. 06-5209, 06522).  
 131. Kate Zernike, McCain and Obama Split on Justices’ Guantanamo Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 13, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/us/politics/13candidates.html. 
 132. See Supplemental Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants, supra note 130. 
 133. Id. at 10-11 (arguing that the court should not imply a Bivens remedy in light of “the 
potential for intrusion into military, national security and foreign affairs” and the likelihood that 
individual liability would push officials to “make decisions based upon fear of litigation rather than 
appropriate military policy”). 
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Boumediene in a different context, and not in the extremely defensive context 
of defense of individual clients, the question might have been framed 
differently and the government might have had greater flexibility to reach a 
different conclusion. 
Considering the significance of these decisions, the standard for choosing 
to defend individual defendants, as well as who makes the decision and the 
process for reaching it, are critical. Yet as a general matter, career line attorneys 
provide a “routine” review of the request for representation and approve it “as a 
matter of course” in “the overwhelming majority of cases.”134 It is only 
“difficult or novel cases,” or “cases where initial review suggests the request 
should be denied,” where additional guidance is sought from higher offices 
such as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General overseeing the Torts Branch.135 
Likewise, DOJ has long followed a “duty to defend” policy with respect 
to congressional statutes.136 In accordance with this “longstanding practice,” 
the Department defends “the constitutionality of duly-enacted statutes if 
reasonable arguments can be made in their defense.”137 A decision not to 
defend such actions is as fraught with complications as it is rare.138 
Decisions to defend agency actions or policies are somewhat more 
complicated. There does not seem to exist a formal written doctrine for such 
decisions, and this is an area worthy of further exploration, but in practice the 
result seems to be similar to other categories of defensive decisionmaking. At 
the outset, DOJ litigators almost always defend agency action as matter of 
course139 (and a contrary decision would likely face agency outcry over 
interference in agency decisionmaking). The presumption starts to wear down 
somewhat when the government must decide whether to appeal a loss, at which 
point the Solicitor General takes the reins and may exercise a greater degree of 
discretion in whether and how to defend the case—and may be more inclined to 
confess error140—though he or she is constrained to a degree by the record of 
the government’s involvement in the case until that point. Ultimately, the 
overwhelming bias is in favor of defending agency action. 
Precedent, as would be expected, plays a significant role in the 
Department’s decisionmaking, particularly when that precedent stems from 
 
 134. See Brown, supra note 125, at 2. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See, e.g., Daniel Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 
1183 (2012) (exploring the historial practice of the executive branch—and “very strong presumption” of 
defending federal statutes). 
 137. See, e.g., Letter from Eric H. Holder, Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, House of 
Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. 
 138. See, e.g., Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1078 (2001) (“In 
the unique context of a constitutional challenge to legislation, the interests of the Congress and the 
Executive are generally pretty clear: they have spoken. And as a result, at least when those interests do 
not conflict with the Solicitor General’s duty to the courts, the Department of Justice defends Acts of 
Congress in all but the rarest of cases.”); see also Letter from Eric H. Holder to John A. Boehner, supra 
note 137 (explaining that the DOMA decision is “the rare case where the proper course is to forgo the 
defense of this statute”). 
 139. See, e.g., Barron & Kagan, supra note 28. 
 140. See, e.g., Pillard, supra note 61, at 709. 
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positions the executive has taken previously in court. As Paul Stephan has 
explained, the positions government lawyers take in court “to a certain extent, 
lock in their successors,” and any repudiation or reversal of a prior position 
“come[s] at a considerable cost.”141 This is based on an understanding that a 
change in position “generally undermines the credibility of the government’s 
legal representatives with the courts,” and the practical reality that career 
litigators, “will likely continue to appear before the courts even after their 
current political masters leave office.”142 Litigators are thus often considered a 
stabilizing force that reinforces a status quo against political wind shifts. There 
is much truth to this view, yet it does not fully account for the pressures of 
defensive litigation, which push litigators to view any precedent in that light. 
Litigation pressures can serve as a ballast, but that may at times mean simply 
entrenching the initially-politicized legal positions and policies of one 
administration, long into the next. Additionally, other executive precedent may 
not carry as much weight for litigators as their own positions taken in litigation; 
therefore in a novel lawsuit, litigation pressures may prompt a rethinking of 
prior executive legal positions (particularly if they were not public) toward a 
more aggressive view of presidential authority.143 
Moreover, government litigators are moved by another set of pressures 
closely related to their defensive posture, which is to win the case while 
preserving as much flexibility as possible for the President. As repeat players, 
executive branch litigators cannot easily concede arguments that may permit a 
win in the case at hand while jeopardizing others. Thus, even in a case where 
litigation instincts might otherwise promote the articulation of a limited 
understanding of the executive’s authority, litigators may be constrained in 
their ability to do so by other interests, such as separate ongoing litigation or 
even hypothetical future action.144 Tension may thus arise between the pressure 
to win the case and the pressure to preserve executive flexibility; the resulting 
decision may depend on the significance of the policies involved and the risk 
calculation of judicial intervention. 
*     *     * 
Defensive litigation is an aggressive catalyst for executive branch legal 
interpretation and policy, one that is likely to crowd out other decisionmaking 
mechanisms, and it can produce a great range of outcomes. These effects are 
not entirely retrogressive. Litigation shines a spotlight on action that may 
 
 141. Paul B. Stephan, The Limits of Change: International Human Rights Under the Obama 
Administration, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 488, 502 (2012) (citing Morrison, supra note 25); id. at 502 
n.39 (noting that Morrison “discuss[es] the institutional stability of the executive’s legal positions”). 
 142. Id. at 502. 
 143. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 53, at 519-22 (explaining how the government reversed its 
position on particular nonrefoulement treaty obligations in the course of litigation over the Haitian 
interdiction program). 
 144. See, e.g., Steve Vladeck, Why Hedges v. Obama Is Terribly Perplexing, LAWFARE (May 
17, 2012, 12:33 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/05/why-hedges-v-obama-is-terribly-perplexing 
(asking why—in a case involving the executive’s detention authority under the 2012 NDAA—the 
government refused to make concessions that might have resolved the case). 
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otherwise fly under the radar, forcing the executive—with muscle other 
catalysts do not share—to crystallize and explain publicly its legal rationale for 
its actions. It prompts additional layers of internal review of agency action, thus 
promoting interagency involvement on what might have previously been the 
purview of a single agency, and the specific inclusion of a particular brand of 
bureaucratic actor—the career litigator. 
Litigation can also prompt policy change in an effort to head off judicial 
interference.145 In addition to refining its legal arguments in anticipation of 
litigation, the government sometimes takes on forward-looking policy change 
rather than concede backward-looking legal obligations as a means of 
presenting the best possible face in court and staving off a potential adverse 
judgment.146 In other words, rather than concede that, for example, the 
government is obligated to apply specific treaty provisions to military 
detainees, the executive might choose instead to simply extend a heightened 
level of treatment as a matter of discretion, in an attempt to circumvent a 
judicial ruling on the matter.147 Finally, litigation can also entail a loss in court 
that may dramatically change the executive’s position. 
Nevertheless, in an area of considerable deference to executive positions, 
the most significant effect of the litigation catalyst is the shifting of internal 
power toward DOJ litigators, and the pressures it imposes on executive actors 
to defend past action and to preserve the greatest possible flexibility for the 
President. Defensive litigation is one of the most significant interpretation 
catalysts triggering executive legal decisionmaking, and is an instinctive go-to 
means of challenging executive action. Yet litigation—and, in particular, 
defensive litigation in the lower courts, where the government’s arguments first 
take shape—triggers a process that is almost diametrically opposed to effecting 
 
 145. See generally Ashley Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive 
Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (arguing that 
judicial involvement can prompt executive branch national security policy changes even beyond the 
limited cases in which the executive actually loses). 
 146. Id. 
 147. It is impossible to know all of the reasons behind policy changes taken by the executive, 
but there are multiple examples of major policy initiatives or decisions announced in the midst of 
potentially momentous litigation, including revised procedures for detention at Bagram in the midst of 
post-Boumediene litigation addressing whether the writ of habeas corpus would run there, e.g., Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting the executive’s change in procedures 
“being implemented only now when the case is before the Court of Appeals,” and choosing not to rely 
on them in deciding the case); new administrative procedures for detainees at Guantánamo in the face of 
intense litigation pressure from habeas cases winding through the courts, SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT 
AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 
REPORT, LEAVING GUANTÁNAMO 54 (2012), 
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=dd0b4c6e-528e-4138-9755-86bae92e1cdb 
(quoting former Navy Secretary and then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England as telling the 
House Armed Services Committee that the Department wanted to “get ahead of the curve” and 
“foreclose th[e] possibility” of court-ordered releases based on procedural technicalities by addressing 
the matter themselves); and decisions to transfer individual detainees out of military detention, made in 
light of litigation risks, Final Report: Guantánamo Review Task Force, DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL. 8 (Jan. 
22, 2010) http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf (explaining that the evaluation 
to ensure lawfulness of a detainee’s continued detention took into account “the government’s case for 
defending the detention in any habeas litigation”). 
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progressive change in legal policy. It is driven by tight deadlines that do not 
generally permit comprehensive collaboration or deliberation; handled 
predominantly by career litigators without significant authority or institutional 
incentive to promote additional constraints on executive authority; and shaped 
by its inherently defensive posture. Thus, in areas of significant deference from 
courts, such as national security and international law, defensive litigation is 
intrinsically ill-suited to advancing greater legal constraints on the executive. 
To the contrary, defensive litigation encourages the executive to assert a 
generous view of its legal authority, which—outside of those rare government 
losses—the process of litigation will only entrench. 
B. The Treaty Body Reporting Catalyst 
Unlike litigation, the U.S. government’s interaction with international 
bodies over its international law obligations is in many ways a much less 
public, less understood process. Yet this interaction regularly triggers questions 
about the U.S. position on interpretation of treaty provisions that bind the 
government, which government lawyers are called upon to address. 
The United States has signed and ratified several human rights treaties 
that contain periodic reporting requirements, including the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT). These instruments establish, respectively, the Human Rights 
Committee and the Committee against Torture (CAT Committee).148 Among 
these committees’ duties are the receipt and consideration of periodic reports 
from the states parties to the treaties on measures they have taken to implement 
their treaty obligations.149 In practice, treaty body reporting is an elaborate 
process and involves a fair degree of back and forth with the committees. Per 
the CAT optional reporting procedure, which has been adopted by the United 
States, and will govern U.S. reports going forward, the process now begins with 
a list of questions asked by the CAT Committee, to which the states respond.150 
Under the original CAT procedure, the state first submitted its report, and then 
defended the report through written and oral answers to committee questions.151 
Both processes culminated in a set of Committee observations and 
recommendations for the state party’s consideration. 
 
 148. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-
2, (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, (1988), 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. 
 149. See ICCPR, supra note 148, art. 40 (obligating the states parties “to submit reports on the 
measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made 
in the enjoyment of those rights”); CAT, supra note 148, art. 19(1) (obligating the state parties to submit 
“reports on the measures they have taken to give effect to their undertakings under this Convention”). 
 150. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Oct. 31-Nov. 25, 2011, Status of the Optional Reporting Procedure of the Committee 
Against Torture and Proposals for Its Revision, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/47/2 (Sept. 27, 2011). 
 151. CAT, supra note 148, art. 19 
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There exists in the scholarship a vibrant debate regarding the proper role 
of treaty bodies in advancing or interpreting international law through 
expression of their own views on legal interpretation and compliance.152 This 
Article does not wade into that debate directly but rather explores the processes 
these reporting commitments may trigger within a particular state, here the U.S. 
executive branch, and how those processes affect the government’s legal 
interpretations, thus contributing in a more circuitous manner to the evolution 
of international law. The internal U.S. executive processes that flow from these 
reporting requirements contrast sharply with the decisionmaking processes that 
emerge from other catalysts discussed herein. In particular, the treaty body 
catalyst both provides an opportunity for and encourages decisionmaking in a 
forum predisposed toward interagency collaboration, human rights 
advancement, and prioritization of international law. 
1. Who Has the Pen? 
U.S. engagement with other countries and international bodies over its 
international law obligations is handled primarily by the State Department 
Office of the Legal Adviser (L), an office of approximately 175 career 
attorneys153 with only one political appointee, the Legal Adviser, who typically 
chooses one or two special assistants but has little ability to change the political 
composition of the office.154 L attorneys serve, inter alia, as agency general 
counsel, as general international law experts and thus advisers to the rest of the 
executive, and as essential representatives on U.S. delegations that negotiate 
treaties and other agreements internationally.155 
L plays a primary role in drafting and coordinating the U.S. reports to the 
treaty body committees and responses to the committees’ follow-up questions, 
and organizes the delegation of officials from the interagency who will attend 
the committee hearings. Within L, the officials tasked with driving the process 
are career attorneys housed within the Human Rights division (L/HRR).156 This 
division is tasked generally with providing the Department with legal guidance 
on human rights and refugee law and representing the U.S. government in the 
 
 152. See, e.g., JOSÉ ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 6 (2005); 
Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
905 (2009) (discussing ongoing debate about the role of treaty bodies); Anthea Roberts & Sandesh 
Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International 
Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 107, 116-17 (2011) (calling it “increasingly well-accepted” that 
“bodies such as the ILC and Human Rights Committee influence the development and interpretation of 
international law”); see also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 923 n.102 (2008) (noting 
disagreement between the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the U.S. and U.K. governments over the 
Committee’s role in recognition of treaty reservations). 
 153. Practicing Law in the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state 
.gov/s/l/3190.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2013). 
 154. Rao, supra note 15, at 233. 
 155. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The State Department Legal Adviser’s Office: Eight 
Decades in Peace and War, 100 GEO. L.J. 1747, 1758 (2012). 
 156. Practicing Law in the Office of the Legal Adviser, supra note 153. 
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international arena on these matters.157 Attorneys in L/HRR not only play a 
coordinating role with their counterparts throughout the executive branch; they 
also interact regularly with counterparts in other countries and NGOs, and sit 
on delegations to U.N. and other human rights bodies where they negotiate 
resolutions and painstakingly navigate difficult legal human rights issues.158 
These attorneys, tasked with drafting and coordinating the treaty reports, thus 
bring to that process an intense awareness of the legal positions of other 
countries and their points of tension or sympathy with U.S. positions. Having 
honed their negotiation skills through the process of forcefully advocating on 
behalf of the U.S. government with foreign officials, they are also in a position 
to understand the relative weaknesses of particular U.S. positions, and where 
those positions could stand to be moved. 
In preparing new reports to the relevant treaty bodies, L attorneys 
typically first prepare a draft based largely on prior reports, with attempts to 
address the recommendations and comments from the Committee during the 
last reporting round.159 In addition, significant pieces of treaty reports are often 
farmed out to the critical agencies with the greatest substantive expertise and 
stake in the product so that they may take a first cut. Thus, for example, 
attorneys and policy players at the Department of Defense are heavily involved 
in drafting and reviewing treaty report language addressing detainee or other 
military matters. The Department of Homeland Security might take the lead on 
certain immigration questions, or DOJ on questions regarding prisoners’ rights. 
In such cases L lawyers will work collaboratively with other agencies to craft 
language and keep the process moving. 
2. Mechanisms for Coordination and Decision 
Although as a matter of practice L has historically taken the lead in 
coordinating and crafting the U.S. response to its treaty body reporting 
obligations, formal authority for this process has changed hands to some extent 
over the years, and ultimate decisionmaking authority on the positions the U.S. 
government takes in this context is less clear than it is with litigation. Formal 
coordination authority has been vested in the NSC, through various working 
groups and committees; yet in practice, the enormous task of drafting, 
coordinating, and shepherding treaty body reports through the interagency, 
transmitting them to the committee, and then coordinating the delegation to 
address the committee’s concerns has primarily fallen to L. This process has 
included significant engagement from agencies that hold major expertise or 
investment in the substance of the reports. 
Both the Clinton and Bush Administrations attempted to consolidate the 
treaty reporting process under formal committees run out of the NSC. In 1998, 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.; SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at xix; Koh, supra note 155, at 1773. 
 159. Going forward, reports will also be responsive to the Committee’s list of issues, per the 
new optional reporting process. See supra text accompanying note 150. 
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in an effort to aid implementation of various aspects of the human rights 
treaties ratified over the course of the prior decade, including the treaty body 
reporting requirements, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,107.160 
This order created an “Interagency Working Group on Human Rights Treaties” 
(IWAG), chaired by the National Security Adviser and comprised of 
“appropriate policy and legal representatives at the Assistant Secretary level 
from the Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Department of 
Labor, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other agencies 
as the chair deems appropriate,” though “[t]he principal members may 
designate alternates to attend meetings in their stead.”161 Among the principal 
functions of the IAWG was “coordinating the preparation of reports that are to 
be submitted by the United States in fulfillment of treaty obligations.”162 
Despite the IAWG’s broad mandate to coordinate treaty body reporting, 
the U.S. government’s first report to the CAT Committee was prepared and 
coordinated by the State Department, with “extensive assistance” from other 
agencies.163 In any event, the IAWG’s run was short-lived. Shortly after taking 
office President Bush abolished and replaced the existing working groups, 
transferring the IAWG duties to a new NSC Policy Coordination Committee 
(PCC) on Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations.164 This 
new PCC never got off the ground.165 Instead, L staff engaged to coordinate 
and draft the now-overdue reports, with significant assistance from NSC, who 
agreed to prioritize the reports and chair the interagency meetings, thus 
ensuring greater interagency participation.166 
Since then, L has continued to play the primary role in coordinating U.S. 
responses to the treaty bodies, with the assistance of NSC staff (NSS) and other 
officials within the State Department and throughout the interagency.167 This 
may be due as much to manpower—NSS is notoriously short-staffed—as to L’s 
expertise and familiarity with the treaty bodies. L attorneys take on the lion’s 
share of drafting and revising, and coordinating with the interagency, with 
assistance from NSS, especially with respect to promoting interagency 
participation.168 The State-led process has faced criticism from some that, as an 
 
 160. Exec. Order No. 13,107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991 (Dec. 10, 1998). 
 161. Id. at 68,992. 
 162. Id. ¶ 4(b)(ii). 
 163. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, 
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5, at 4 (Feb. 9, 2000). 
 164. Memorandum from President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive, 
(Feb. 13, 2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm. 
 165. Tara Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 389, 402 (2008). 
 166. Id.; Interview with Sandra Hodgkinson, Former Director for International Justice, Nat’l 
Sec. Council; Deputy to Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State; Deputy 
Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Detainee Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 19, 2012). 
 167. Melish, supra note 165, at 402; Catherine Powell, Human Rights at Home: A Domestic 
Policy Blueprint for the New Administration, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 7, 13, (Oct. 2008), 
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Powell%20full%20combined.pdf. 
 168. Powell, supra note 167, at 7. 
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agency focused on foreign rather than domestic policy, State is unlikely to have 
sufficient influence on domestic actions, which are relevant to much of the 
human rights implementation focus of the committees.169 Nevertheless, under 
the practice of at least the last two Administrations, the State-led reporting 
process has involved intense coordination and vetting between relevant 
agencies, as well as outreach to and consideration of views from local 
governments and representatives from civil society.170 To date, U.S. 
engagement and interagency coordination in the treaty body reporting process 
has been considerable. Despite lags in reporting, the U.S. government has 
crafted extensive reports and has staffed delegations to the committees with 
high-level officials from throughout the executive branch.171 
But the agency with the pen does not necessarily have the final say on 
positions taken by the executive. In addition to the agencies that are asked to 
draft relevant sections of the report, others are asked to comment on or clear 
sections that are relevant to them. While L coordinates the larger project, to the 
extent there is interagency disagreement over a position that cannot be resolved 
through this informal process, NSS will call an interagency meeting to resolve 
the matter.172 At such meetings a premium is placed on reaching agreement. 
There is an understanding on the part of those preparing the reports that buy-in 
from other executive components is essential to keep the process working and 
to ensure the most comprehensive and accurate response. Unlike in litigation, 
in which an individual attorney must face on-the-spot questioning from a judge 
or panel, even the questions asked by the treaty committees are generally 
provided in advance, permitting written responses to be prepared and fully 
vetted.173 The exigencies and pressures that in the litigation context may require 
vesting decisionmaking authority in the hand holding the pen are much less 
intense in the treaty body reporting process. The holder of the pen still plays an 
important role, for the reasons discussed in Subsection III.A.1, but in the treaty-
reporting context, collaboration and consensus are both possible and, in fact, 
are considered paramount. 
3. Contextual Pressures and Utility of the Treaty Body 
Reporting Catalyst 
Unlike in litigation, in which forces align to pressure the executive into a 
defensive position regarding its obligations and preserve maximum flexibility, 
the treaty-reporting context creates pressure and opportunity for the 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. See, e.g., Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America to the United Nations 
Committee on Human Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE ¶ 4 (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/179781.htm [hereinafter ICCPR 
Report]. 
 171. See, e.g., Melish, supra note 165, at 406 (“Although the United States—not unlike many 
other nations—has frequently been late in submitting its reports, it has actively engaged with the 
supervisory treaty bodies in the periodic reporting process . . . .”). 
 172. See supra note 166. 
 173. See infra Part IV. 
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Administration to reach a position in a forum that prioritizes international law 
and human rights to the extent possible.174 The process reminds the U.S. 
government of its legal obligations and promotes compliance with respect to 
policies and enforcement, and can pressure U.S. officials toward interpretations 
of legal commitments that are more in line with the understanding of the 
committee and the international community.175 
U.S. officials tend to view the reports themselves and subsequent 
meetings with the committees as opportunities to highlight positive U.S. 
policies and practice.176 There is thus often a desire on the part of such officials 
to have certain “deliverables”—positive updates on policy, implementation, or 
even an evolving legal interpretation—that they can bring to the committee 
hearings.177 Moreover, advocates for change within the executive can use the 
process instrumentally to promote these developments.178 
Regular reporting on states’ interpretation of treaties in addition to their 
implementation can be critical because new events may raise questions that 
states did not necessarily grapple with at the time of negotiation or ratification. 
Modern circumstances may call for updating the state’s understanding of its 
obligations under a given treaty and assessing how it applies to novel situations 
or contexts. The evolving U.S. understanding of domestic and international law 
as applicable to its detention operations at Guantánamo Bay is one such 
example.179 In the early years after 9/11, the executive’s positions on its legal 
constraints at Guantánamo included the views that neither the writ of habeas 
corpus nor the provisions of various human rights treaties extended to its 
detainee operations there.180 Yet over the course of a decade, these views 
shifted in both dramatic and nuanced ways, due to a mix of both external 
factors and to the executive branch’s own changed positions.181 Such shifts can 
critically affect a state’s interpretation of and compliance with treaty 
obligations, which can raise questions in multiple contexts, including but by no 
means limited to the reporting process. Thus, whether or not the U.S. position 
 
 174. This does not ensure that all positions taken in the treaty-reporting context will align 
perfectly with a progressive human rights agenda—for example, the U.S. government has for years 
clashed with the U.N. Human Rights Committee over the extraterritorial reach of some of its treaty 
obligations—but the treaty-reporting catalyst is more likely to prompt decisionmaking along human 
rights lines than other catalysts. See, e.g., John Bellinger, Administration Submits ICCPR Report, Punts 
on Extraterritorial Application, LAWFARE (Jan. 19, 2012, 10:46 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com 
/2012/01/administration-submits-iccpr-report-punts-on-extraterritorial-application. 
 175. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, The United States’ Oral Response to the 
Questions Asked by the Committee Against Torture (May 8, 2006), www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/68562.htm 
[hereinafter CAT Oral Response] (calling U.S. engagement with the CAT committee over the treaty 
reporting process a “vital instrument in th[e] effort” to “meet[] our domestic and international 
obligations to combat torture”). 
 176. Interview with Sandra Hodgkinson, supra note 166. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See infra Part IV. 
 180. See infra notes 210-214 and accompanying text. 
 181. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793, (2008) (extending the writ of habeas 
corpus to aliens detained at Guantánamo); infra Part IV (exploring the United States’ evolving position 
on the prohibition on the use of statements derived from torture, under the Convention Against Torture). 
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that ultimately arises out of a treaty reporting process conforms to the exact 
views of the committee, the process encourages U.S. officials to come together 
to coordinate and crystallize a position in an environment and through a process 
geared toward promotion of the U.S. record on human rights.182 As one recent 
U.S. report states, the U.S. government views the treaty reporting process as 
“an important tool” in the development of its human rights practices and 
performance, and an “opportunity to engage in a process of stock-taking and 
self-examination.”183 
To be sure, the effect of treaty body reporting on legal change should not 
be overstated. As with other areas of executive branch legal interpretation, new 
interpretations of law occur quite rarely. Government lawyers, wherever they 
are housed throughout the executive, are inherently conservative in conceding 
legal constraints. Moreover, as in other contexts, precedent plays an enormous 
role in the treaty body reporting process, and great emphasis is placed on 
continuity in U.S. positions.184 The focus on consensus means there is a high 
bar for changing the government’s position. If there is no consensus on taking a 
new position, the status quo—or vagueness—is always a potential fallback. 
Nevertheless, the executive does sometimes change course. And unlike 
litigation, the treaty-body reporting catalyst brings together the distinctive 
decisionmaking elements that are best suited to promoting progressive change 
in both law and policy. Where potential “policy windows”185 exist—in areas 
where evolving circumstances call for innovative reasoning, or in areas of 
debate within the executive where potential for change may hinge on 
contextual pressures, involvement of particular players, or simply getting the 
issue onto the agenda—the treaty-body reporting process provides a forum for 
decisionmaking that permits long-term contemplation and coordination, heavy 
input from “expert” agencies, room for interaction between political and career 
players, and space for legal policy development in a context that prioritizes 
international law compliance, the promotion of human rights, and engagement 
with the international community. 
C. Speechmaking as Interpretation Catalyst 
The prior two sections discussed interpretation catalysts that are primarily 
driven by external factors. But internally-triggered events can also operate as 
compelling interpretation catalysts. Decisions to take a particular action or 
implement a policy can fall under this category, as can determinations to make 
a speech to express publicly the Administration’s views on a given matter. 
Speechmaking is a particularly interesting interpretation catalyst as it can be 
provoked by a combination of internal and external factors. And as a somewhat 
more pliable tool than those that are more formally responsible to external 
 
 182. See, e.g., ICCPR Report, supra note 170, ¶ 2. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See infra Part IV. 
 185. See, e.g., KINGDON, supra note 27. 
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bodies like courts or treaty-reporting bodies, it can be employed strategically by 
officials within the government seeking to shape the decisionmaking process.186 
The decision to give a speech on a matter of international law and 
national security is rarely a decision made casually or unilaterally by the 
particular speechmaker herself, and the impetus to do so can be driven by a 
range of internal and external factors. There may exist external pressure, such 
as calls upon the executive—by media, Congress, or others—to explain its 
position in a given area. For example, there have been widespread calls in 
recent years for greater clarity from the Obama Administration regarding its 
legal position on targeting killing, which have resulted in a number of speeches 
by government officials explaining the policy and legal framework in ever 
greater detail.187 Pressure to make public a set of legal views may also come 
from within the Administration, from actors who wish to explain the 
government’s position in an effort to mollify criticism about either the 
substantive decisions or the lack of transparency about the decisionmaking 
process.188 
Speechmaking may simply reveal to the public the pre-existing legal 
rationale for executive policies or programs; it can also be an action-forcing 
mechanism driving the executive to crystallize and finally bind itself to a 
position on a matter.189 As with other interpretation catalysts, speechmaking 
can shape the parameters of a particular decisional moment—its timing and the 
context in which the decision is made—and it can create greater leverage for 
the speechmaker and related officials at the decisionmaking table. There are 
numerous other means officials employ to create leverage, including strategic 
leaking and resignation threats, both of which are unilateral means to influence 
decisionmaking. Speechmaking is distinct in that it actually creates a different 
decisionmaking forum—the process of drafting and coordinating a position and 
language for the speech itself in a very specific context—and thus influences 
 
 186. A distinctive feature of the speechmaking catalyst is that the President himself can and 
does employ it to great effect. There are many reasons a President himself chooses to give a speech, 
some of which are similar to those explored in this section for individual officials. Presidential 
speechmaking, as with speechmaking by other officials, can act as an action-forcing event or drive 
internal process to force agreement on a matter. The President may also use speechmaking to clarify his 
own position publicly and bind those who must implement his decisions. See, e.g., Remarks on National 
Security, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (May 21, 2009). 
 187. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Readings: The Canonical National Security Law Speeches of 
Obama Administration Senior Officials and General Counsels, LAWFARE (June 11, 2012, 3:37 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/readings-the-canonical-national-security-law-speeches-of-obama  
-administration-senior-officials-and-general-counsels. 
 188. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, Dan Klaidman on Stephen Preston’s Harvard Speech, 
LAWFARE (Apr. 16, 2012, 11:22 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/04/dan-klaidman-on-stephen   
-prestons-harvard-speech (suggesting that Stephen Preston and Harold Koh had been among those 
within the executive pushing for greater transparency regarding the policy on targeted killings). 
 189. See, e.g., RICE, supra note 74, at 499-500 (explaining that, upon finding herself on her way 
to a NATO meeting in the midst of a press flurry about CIA black sites, she was able to push the NSC, 
other Principals, and the President to allow her to make a statement that both “hinted that the CIA was 
indeed operating facilities overseas,” and announced if not a legal interpretation regarding the extra-
territoriality of certain U.S. human rights obligations, at least a statement of legal policy leaning toward 
that position). 
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substance by transforming the process, shaping the contextual pressures, and 
ensuring specific coordination. 
1. Who Has the Pen? 
Unlike litigation and treaty-reporting, which are ongoing processes that 
may cross administrations and can be channeled to some degree by the career 
bureaucracy, speechmaking is inherently top-down, involving high-level, 
politically-appointed officials. Career officials may be involved but just as 
often it may be the political assistants surrounding the speechmaker who assist 
substantively in the process. 
Which official volunteers or is asked to take on a speech is critical 
because speechmaking—whether intended for this purpose or not—gives that 
official, and those working for her, the pen on the public representation of an 
issue, and it can thus be an opportunity for an official to gain inclusion in a 
matter to which she might otherwise not have access.190 Speechmaking may 
grant to an official otherwise out of the loop not only a seat at the 
decisionmaking table, but also a place of significant influence.191 Once a key 
administration official is slated to give a speech, her views cannot be 
disregarded. She cannot be left out of the speechwriting room. The words will 
be hers to say or to refuse to say, and this provides some degree of leverage 
over the position and over what will be made public. Going forward, these 
statements are generally taken to be the considered views of the U.S. 
government, and cannot easily be reversed.192 Indeed, they are likely to be 
referred to in other contexts where U.S. officials are required to explain the 
government’s position.193 Of course, it is unlikely that speechmaking could be 
used to draw into the conversation an official who has no relevance to a 
particular area, but it may be effective in pulling up a critical chair to the table 
for an individual with both expertise and a structural connection to the matter at 
hand. 
The elevated seat at the table does not come cheaply for the speechmaker. 
The speechmaking-as-strategy process operates as a two-way street. By 
presenting the U.S. views on a topic in a public forum, the speechmaking 
official is sanctioning those views and signing on quite publicly to the U.S. 
position, in a way that will be difficult, if not impossible, to walk away from at 
a later date.194 It is this legitimizing effect that the speechmaker often brings to 
the table in exchange for greater influence in the cultivation of the views that 
 
 190. See, e.g., CHAYES, supra note 14, at 31. 
 191. See infra text accompanying notes 198-200. 
 192. This Article focuses not on statements made without coordination or otherwise ultra-vires, 
but rather on the properly-articulated and vetted positions of the executive branch. 
 193. See, e.g., Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction at 6, Hedges v. Obama, 890 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-
00331-KBF) (quoting DOD General Counsel Johnson’s speech for the U.S. position on the scope of the 
AUMF as it applies to “associated forces” of al-Qaeda and the Taliban).  
 194. Id. 
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will be presented.195 This phenomenon may be most palpable in areas where an 
official may have greater legitimacy with a particular population that the 
Administration hopes to sway in large part because she is seen—rightly or 
wrongly—as potentially holding views in tension with the Administration’s 
policies in that area. In such cases, the official both may desire greater leverage 
internally in order to influence decisionmaking, and may have an important 
legitimizing power in sanctioning the resulting views. Thus, both the 
speechmaking official and others in the Administration have something to gain 
in finding a compromise that permits the official to give a public speech on the 
matter. 
By way of example, State Department Legal Advisers—and even 
Secretaries of State196—have often been deployed to explain the U.S. 
government’s legal position on matters affecting international law and national 
security, to both international and domestic audiences. Harold Koh’s 2010 
speech at the American Society of International Law, in which he discussed the 
Obama Administration’s views toward targeting and detention in the conflict 
with al Qaeda,197 received enormous public attention in part because of his 
stature as a leading human rights advocate. Thus, Koh’s willingness to support 
the Administration’s legal position was a boon to the Administration in facing 
criticism from the human rights community, and Koh presumably may have 
gained greater influence than he might otherwise have had in crafting the public 
statement of the Administration’s position on wartime targeting and detention. 
Previously, under the Bush Administration, Legal Adviser John Bellinger gave 
a number of speeches explaining the U.S. government’s understanding of its 
legal obligations under international law in the conflict with al Qaeda.198 He 
publicly presented, explained, and defended the executive’s positions—and in 
so doing worked toward trying to legitimize them—despite the fact that, as it is 
now widely known, he had had many disagreements with other Bush officials 
over many of the prevailing policies throughout the early years of the 
 
 195. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.  
 196. See supra note 189. 
 197. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 
2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. 
 198. See, e.g., John B. Bellinger, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at the London 
School of Economics: Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism (Oct. 31, 2006), http://www.state.gov 
/s/l/2006/98861.htm (explaining the USG’s position on the law applicable to the conflict with al Qaeda); 
John B. Bellinger, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Keynote Address at the International Law 
Weekend of the American Branch of the International Law Association: Reflections on Four Years as 
Legal Adviser (Oct. 17, 2008) http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/l/rls/111049.htm (explaining the importance 
of L’s role in “international legal diplomacy,” including in the drafting of speeches, articles and blog 
postings, in order to try “to meet our critics on these issues and to narrow the points of 
disagreement . . . even in instances when [he] had urged a different policy”). State Department Legal 
Advisers have long explained U.S. positions on legal authority in matters of national security. See, e.g., 
Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89 (1989) 
(discussing, inter alia, international law regarding the use of force against terrorist groups); William H. 
Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 322 
(2003) (discussing, inter alia, minimum law of war standards that apply to “unprivileged belligerents” in 
armed conflict). 
INGBER DRAFT 12 7.25.13 (FINAL PROOF).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/25/13  3:59 PM 
2013] Interpretation Catalysts 401 
  
Administration.199 Considering the willingness of those other officials to cut the 
State Department out of the decisionmaking loop, as revealed years later by 
Legal Adviser Taft and others,200 the ability to act as speechmaker and public 
face of the Administration’s views of its authority likely elevated L’s role in 
addressing these matters to some degree. At a bare minimum it ensured the 
State Department had a seat at the position-drafting table, which it might 
otherwise not have had. 
2. Mechanisms for Coordination and Decision 
While the speechmaker and her office may hold the pen, this does not 
necessarily result in ultimate decisionmaking authority over what is said or 
revealed publicly. Instead, coordination and consensus are often critical. Unlike 
with other mechanisms discussed, speechmaking does not have a necessary 
externally-driven timetable or set of questions that must be answered. Even 
once a speech is announced, it can always take a diluted or more aggressive 
form depending on what can get cleared in the time officials have to prepare. 
And the lack of an external decisional body means that the executive is free to 
shape the line of argument entirely. This lack of an external focus permits a 
greater premium on consensus and buy-in. The lessened pressure to respond to 
particular questions means that the executive can promulgate and provide only 
those answers that officials are prepared to give. Though internal assumptions 
and norms about coordination and clearance are mutable, the greater the 
coordination in vetting the speech ex ante, the greater the likelihood the speech 
will create internal precedent going forward. This is true in part because, as will 
be explained below, cleared language tends to be recycled in later written 
product addressing the same issues. 
In addition, because speechmaking inherently tends to implicate high-
level public officials, coordination of the government’s position will 
necessarily involve the high-level speechmaker and will likely be vetted among 
colleagues of an equal stature to that official throughout the interagency. And 
unlike other catalysts, speechmaking tends to implicate a host of other 
interested players such as press and communications officials who bring unique 
perspectives and pressures to the table. 
3. Contextual Pressures and Utility of the Speechmaking 
Catalyst 
As a catalyst over which executive officials exercise significant control, 
speechmaking is explicitly used to answer criticism, explain a position, or 
highlight positive policies—in a highly public manner—when doing so is seen 
as useful to an official or the executive more broadly. Thus it encourages the 
promulgation of positions that (1) can be issued publicly and (2) will satisfy a 
 
 199. See, e.g., BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY (2008). 
 200. See, e.g., id.; SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 12. 
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given audience, on (3) a timetable that serves the executive or a particular 
official. 
With the speechmaking catalyst the audience may be multifaceted; thus a 
speechmaker may seek, for example, simultaneously to reassure a civil 
liberties-oriented listener of the reasonable constraints on the President’s 
authority to use military force to target particular groups or individuals, while 
assuring a security-oriented listener that the executive branch is aggressively 
pursuing security threats.201 It is also an audience over which the official has 
some control, by for example choosing to present her speech at a particular 
forum—although in the internet age, that control is rarely perfect—and she may 
exercise that control as a way of seeking to influence the message. 
Speechmaking provides an opportunity for laying out new policy or legal 
views in a context in which particular officials can manage and to some degree 
manipulate the timetable. Speechmaking often builds on positions that are 
either already formed or are in the process of forming internally within the 
executive, but an upcoming speech—and thus the decision to give it—can bring 
matters to a head and shape the pressures affecting the decision. 
Finally, speechmaking can further entrench a position first by creating a 
vetted written document, and then through its public disclosure. As with 
positions taken in other contexts, the views expressed by U.S. officials in 
speeches are generally taken to be the coordinated views of the U.S. 
government as a whole, and are difficult (and should require explanation) to 
later reverse.202 Unlike litigation and the treaty-body reporting process, 
speechmaking is not specifically directed at a formal body that will hold the 
U.S. government to its prior positions and demand explanation for change; 
nevertheless, the media and voting public will likely expect such explanation, 
and speeches are generally a more public medium than briefs or treaty 
reports.203 And as a practical matter, the vetting and clearing of the executive’s 
position on an issue, in particular, an issue of legal interpretation, can be so 
difficult and time-consuming that once a speech or other statement is cleared, it 
is repeatedly recycled and becomes the go-to source for all talking points, 
reports, briefs or anything that requires explaining the government’s position 
 
 201. See, e.g., Jeh Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Dean’s Lecture at Yale Law 
School: National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration (Feb. 22, 2012), 
available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/jeh-johnson-speech-at-yale-law-school (outlining an 
expansive geographic scope of the conflict while dismissing a “Global War on Terror”). 
 202. The extent to which various means of presenting the U.S. government’s legal views are 
considered binding by either the executive or external actors is complex and worthy of future 
exploration. Trevor Morrison has examined this concept in the OLC context, and with Curtis Bradley 
explores the precedential value of executive action in relation to separation of powers concerns. See 
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 411 (2012); Morrison, supra note 25. 
 203. Indeed, courts have taken note of executive speechmaking. See Jan Crawford, Appeals 
Court Fires Back at Obama’s Comments on Health Care Case, CBS NEWS (Apr. 4, 2012), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504564_162-57408827-504564/appeals-court-fires-back-at-obamas-comments 
-on-health-care-case. 
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on that matter, further extending—and prolonging—the effect of the initial 
statement.204 
Unlike the litigation and treaty body catalysts, speechmaking does not 
tend to provide an opportunity for granularity of legal positions. The purpose is 
generally to explain the executive’s views or policy at a level comprehensible 
to the public, including non-lawyers and non-experts. But like these other 
catalysts, it would be rare for speechmaking to force the executive to take a 
position that all or most internal officials would otherwise aggressively avoid. 
In fact, speechmaking does not necessarily tend in a given substantive direction 
other than toward greater transparency. Speechmaking can be defensive when it 
is employed to explain prior action; it can emphasize human rights or 
international law when used to curry favor with an international audience. 
As a procedural tool, however, speechmaking has a clear influence within 
the executive. Speechmaking’s most significant procedural effect is its 
necessary inclusion of a particular high-level official into the decisionmaking 
process. The speechmaker will also often control the nature of the audience to 
whom she speaks, and thus can influence the contextual pressures surrounding 
the speech. Thus the speechmaker can drive a decisionmaking process around a 
particular timetable, shape the players involved, influence the contextual 
pressures, ensure the durability of the position expressed, and secure her own 
position-of-honor at the decisionmaking table. Speechmaking may thus be one 
of the most instrumental catalysts available for high-level executive officials. 
IV. COMPARING CATALYSTS, A CASE STUDY: THE 2005-2006 REPORT TO THE 
COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE 
Much legal decisionmaking—in particular the decision to change course 
from a prior legal position or to announce a new one—involves mixed 
questions of law and policy.205 This is especially so in areas such as 
international law and national security where there often exists some 
ambiguity, evolving norms, or a range of views on difficult questions. Such 
decisionmaking often involves not only guidance regarding the available 
reasonable interpretations of the law, but the policy decision to choose one 
interpretation over another, to change course, or to announce a position rather 
than preserve flexibility, which may be based not only on that legal guidance 
but on a host of other factors including morality, public opinion, or the 
positions of other states. 
Momentous legal change is difficult and requires a perfect storm of 
contextual and procedural elements in order to succeed in challenging the status 
quo.206 It requires the participation and investment of decisionmakers with 
sufficiently high-level authority and political will to commit to new decisions 
that will bind the government; a process that both creates pressure to act while 
 
 204. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text. 
 205. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 155. 
 206. See, e.g., KINGDON, supra note 27; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 21, at 8. 
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permitting sufficient time for the potential alternatives to be discussed and 
consequences evaluated; and contextual pressures that are conducive to or even 
incentivize change. Interpretation catalysts play a significant role in shaping 
many if not all of these factors, and thus distinct catalysts trigger processes that 
are more or less suited for effecting legal policy change or for entrenching the 
status quo. Which catalyst triggers the ultimate decisionmaking process can 
thus be decisive in determining the resulting decision and can operate as a 
facilitator or roadblock to change. Yet which of these processes takes hold is 
often not a reasoned choice but relates instead to the force of a particular 
catalyst, or can even be as simple a matter as which interpretation catalyst 
occurs first. 
This Part applies the theoretical framework discussed in previous sections 
to a concrete example, the U.S. reporting process to the Committee against 
Torture in 2005 to 2006. The following case study highlights the effects of 
individual interpretation catalysts, in particular, the treaty body reporting 
catalyst and its contrast with the litigation catalyst, on the position of the U.S. 
government regarding the application of its obligations under the Convention 
Against Torture to wartime detainees. 
*     *     * 
In the spring of 2006, in the midst of scandals over detainee abuse, 
reports of interagency antagonism over legal and policy decisions, setbacks in 
the courts over many wartime policies concerning detention and trial of 
detainees, and widespread criticism of the Administration’s relationship with 
the international community and human rights bodies in particular, a high-level 
delegation of officials from several agencies throughout the Bush 
Administration traveled to Geneva to present and answer questions regarding 
the U.S. report to the U.N. Committee Against Torture. 
Signed in 1988 and ratified in 1994, the CAT is one of the major human 
rights treaties to which the United States is a party.207 As a general matter, the 
CAT prohibits acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment (CIDT), and places requirements on states parties to prevent such 
acts and investigate allegations of abuse.208 
Historically, there has been controversy between the U.S. government and 
other CAT parties over the scope of its application; U.S. officials have, over the 
years, repeatedly suggested limitations to the U.S. understanding of the CAT’s 
substantive provisions and jurisdictional scope. At the time of ratification, the 
United States made several reservations and understandings, including to the 
definitions of both torture and CIDT, in part to ensure that U.S. obligations 
would be coterminous with existing obligations under the U.S. Constitution and 
other federal laws.209 
 
 207. See CAT, supra note 148. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See CAT, supra note 148 (reservations and understandings of the United States upon 
ratification); Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Convention Against 
Torture and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 15 (1988) [hereinafter 
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With respect to its jurisdictional scope, U.S. officials historically have 
asserted both that particular provisions of the CAT do not apply 
extraterritorially, and that the Convention does not apply to situations of armed 
conflict, and by extension that it does not apply to detainee operations, 
including to the military detention facilities at Guantánamo.210 For example, 
during negotiations leading up to the Convention, a U.S. representative stated 
that the Convention “was never intended to apply to armed conflicts,” 
suggesting concern that overlapping jurisdiction between the CAT and the 
Geneva Conventions “would undermine the objective of eradicating torture.”211 
In the early Bush years, the consistent position was that relevant CAT 
provisions did not apply to detainee operations or outside of the United 
States.212 And in the context of domestic litigation in which the U.S. 
government was defending itself against allegations of detainee abuse at 
Guantánamo at the time of the CAT report, the government was aggressively 
fighting any extension of judicially enforceable rights to detainees at 
Guantánamo.213 It therefore should have come as no surprise when, in its 
response to questions from the CAT Committee in 2006, the U.S. delegation 
confirmed the U.S. position that the law of armed conflict, and not the CAT, 
applied as “the lex specialis applicable to” “U.S. detention operations in 
Guantánamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq [because they] are part of ongoing armed 
conflicts.”214 One particular question, however, had not yet directly arisen in 
U.S. domestic litigation and was thus somewhat up for grabs at the time of the 
2005-2006 treaty reporting process. Yet it was nevertheless an issue of pressing 
importance and great controversy. That issue was the admissibility in legal 
proceedings of statements derived from alleged torture of detainees held at 
Guantánamo and elsewhere in connection with armed conflict.215 
Article 15 of the CAT requires that state parties “shall ensure that any 
statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not 
 
CAT Transmittal] (noting that “Article 16 is arguably broader than existing U.S. law,” and thus 
recommending a reservation to Article 16 in order “[t]o make clear that the United States construes the 
phrase [CIDT] to be coextensive with its constitutional guarantees against cruel, unusual, and inhumane 
treatment”). 
 210. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, United States Written Response to Questions Asked by 
the Committee Against Torture (Apr. 28, 2006), www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/68554.htm [hereinafter CAT 
Written Response]; CAT Oral Response, supra note 175. 
 211. Rep. of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Comm’n on Human Rights, 40th Sess. ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1984/72 (Mar. 9, 1984). Why a duplicative ban would undermine the prohibition was not 
clarified. 
 212. See supra note 210. 
 213. See infra note 237 and accompanying text. 
 214. CAT Oral Response, supra note 175. Because this statement rested on a lex specialis 
argument, it did not necessarily address whether Guantánamo was properly considered “territory under 
[U.S.] jurisdiction” for the purposes of relevant CAT articles. See CAT, supra note 148, arts. 2, 5, 7, 11-
13, 16. 
 215. A scant handful of courts had previously addressed U.S. obligations under Article 15 in the 
extradition context. See, e.g., In re Extradition of Atuar, 300 F. Supp. 2d 418, 432 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) 
aff’d sub nom. Atuar v. United States, 156 F. App’x 555 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that even if the CAT 
were self-executing, petitioner had not “established” that the relevant statement was made as a result of 
torture). 
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be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of 
torture as evidence that the statement was made.”216 During the advice and 
consent to ratification process, the Reagan Administration clarified to the 
Senate that existing U.S. law provided more protective exclusionary rules than 
the CAT provision, based on both U.S. constitutional protections as well as 
evidentiary hearsay rules.217 Therefore no further implementing legislation was 
created or considered necessary in order to effectuate U.S. compliance with 
Article 15. 
Thus when questions arose regarding the application of Article 15 to 
proceedings at Guantánamo, officials suddenly faced the need to crystallize 
U.S. views on the provision. On the one hand, several U.S. government 
officials had repeatedly stated, including within the context of the CAT 
committee hearings, U.S. views on the non-applicability of the CAT to 
detention operations.218 On the other hand, the plain language of Article 15—
“in any proceedings”—would not seem to permit any exception. When the U.S. 
government submitted its report in the spring of 2005, it dodged this question 
by restricting its response to U.S. criminal laws applicable domestically. While 
it discussed various proceedings in use at Guantánamo—specifically, 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), Administrative Review Boards 
(ARBs), and military commissions—it made no mention at all of evidentiary 
standards for coerced statements or of the applicability of any CAT provisions 
to these proceedings.219 Considering the U.S. position on the limited scope of 
the CAT in armed conflict, and, in particular, to detainee operations, the 
Committee might have reasonably assumed the U.S. position was that Article 
15 simply did not apply to these proceedings. The Committee thus asked 
explicitly, in its questions following the U.S. submission, how the U.S. 
government implemented the Article 15 prohibition in CSRTs and ARBs at 
Guantánamo.220 And the U.S. delegation answered, in a response that may have 
shocked some of the Committee members and other followers of the matter: 
“Article 15 of the Convention is a treaty obligation of the United States, and the 
United States is obligated to abide by that obligation in Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals and Administrative Review Boards.”221 
The U.S. response also included a reference to a recent update in its 
military commissions proceedings, asking that the Committee take note of the 
recently issued “Military Commission Instruction Number 10, dated March 24, 
2006, which provides that ‘the commission shall not admit statements 
established to have been made as a result of torture as evidence against an 
 
 216. See CAT, supra note 148. 
 217. CAT Transmittal, supra note 209, at 14-15. 
 218. See supra notes 210-214 and accompanying text. 
 219. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Consideration of Reports Submtted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: 
Second Periodic Report of the United States of America to the Committee Against Torture, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/48/Add.3 (June 29, 2005) [hereinafter Second CAT Report]. 
 220. CAT Written Response, supra note 210, ¶ 42. 
 221. Id. 
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accused, except as evidence against a person accused of torture as evidence the 
statement was made.’”222 That Commission Instruction, issued by the 
Department of Defense General Counsel Jim Haynes just over a month before 
the delegation made its way to Geneva, and well after the U.S. team had 
received the specific questions from the Committee requesting a direct response 
on the CAT’s applicability to Guantánamo proceedings, itself references CAT 
Article 15 when presenting the new rule, though an explicit statement of the 
CAT’s applicability to military commissions is absent both in the Instruction 
and in the response to the Committee.223 
What led to the seemingly sudden decision by the U.S. government to 
bind itself explicitly to legal constraints under the CAT that it had previously 
seemed to evade? Who was responsible for this legal interpretation and what 
was the influence of the CAT reporting process on the internal decision 
process? It is impossible to determine one single factor that led to the statement 
before the CAT Committee and the prior changes to the military commission 
rules, but it is likely that the existence and looming deadline of the reporting 
process played an influential role in both; that the decisionmaking procedures, 
relevant players and their relative influence were shaped by the nature of the 
process; and that the ultimate legal position might very well have been avoided 
or come out a completely different way had the matter first arisen in a different 
context. 
First, the position taken by U.S. government officials at the CAT 
Committee on Article 15 was no mistake. To the contrary, it is clear from what 
is known about this statement and the reporting process, and from the 
description in the report itself, that statements made to the Committee were the 
thoroughly considered product of multiple agencies and officials at many levels 
working assiduously over the course of several years and through extensive 
coordination.224 Although the reporting process was led by the State 
Department, the reports and follow-up questions were vetted thoroughly 
through relevant agencies.225 The answers were prepared in advance in written 
form by an interagency process, and then delivered orally by a delegation 
consisting of high-level representatives from the Departments of State, 
Defense, and Justice.226 
Second, as a structural matter, in contrast to the litigation context, L 
attorneys held the pen on drafting the treaty report and subsequent questions, 
 
 222. Id. 
 223. William J. Haynes II, Military Commission Instruction, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. 10 (Mar. 24, 
2006), http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2006/d20060327MCI10.pdf. 
 224. See, e.g., Second CAT Report, supra note 219, ¶ 2 (explaining that the “report was 
prepared by the U.S. Department of State . . . with extensive assistance from the U.S. Department of 
Justice . . . the U.S. Department of Homeland Security . . . the U.S. Department of Defense . . . and other 
relevant departments and agencies of the United States Government”). 
 225. Id. 
 226. CAT Written Response, supra note 210; CAT Oral Response, supra note 175 (statements 
of State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger, Department of Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Detainee Affairs Cully Stimson, and Department of Justice Associate Deputy Attorney 
General Tom Monheim). 
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and the State Department Legal Adviser was the head of the delegation to the 
Committee in Geneva when the government presented its responses.227 This 
does not mean that L attorneys held ultimate authority over legal interpretation 
in preparing the report, or over this question specifically. To the contrary, there 
is no question that attorneys in the Department of Defense, in particular, and 
Justice as well, were involved in crafting the answers.228 DOD attorneys may 
very well have penned this response. And DOJ attorneys would certainly have 
cleared on it, though it would most likely have been OLC rather than the 
litigating offices; certainly, if they were involved at all, litigators would not 
have had ultimate decisionmaking authority.229 Instead, the balance of power 
would have shifted—at least as a relative matter—in the direction of State 
Department officials as coordinators of the process, and Defense Department 
officials as the relevant clients who would have to comply with any eventual 
decision. 
Third, as noted above, U.S. officials view the reports and subsequent 
meetings with the Committee as opportunities to highlight positive aspects of 
U.S. policies and compliance with the treaty. Moreover, this particular round of 
treaty reporting took place in an incredibly tense, even hostile, time for U.S. 
relations with the international community on these issues. The fact that the 
State Department organized such a high-level delegation, which included 
officials from DOD and DOJ, suggests that U.S. officials were doing 
everything they could to show respect for the Committee, and may have hoped 
to use the opportunity to promote a better image and better relationships 
internationally.230 If any context could prompt forward-leaning positions from 
U.S. government officials, this was one. 
I do not argue that the CAT Committee reporting process was the only 
factor in the government’s legal interpretation of its Article 15 obligations, 
though it provided the forum in which to do it. In fact, there were many 
domestic issues percolating at the time of this process that bore directly on 
some of these questions. The Bush Administration had faced extended criticism 
for some time regarding what critics viewed as overly lax and unjust standards 
in the various proceedings addressing detention and punishment at Guantánamo 
Bay. It was in the midst of incremental reforms in the face of sharp public 
outcry, adverse Supreme Court decisions, and congressional legislation seeking 
to modify Guantánamo procedures.231 In particular, Congress had in 2005 
passed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which, in pertinent part, required 
that CSRTs and ARBs take into account, when assessing the “status or 
disposition of any detainee,” “whether any statement derived from or relating to 
 
 227. CAT Oral Response, supra note 175. 
 228. See supra note 224. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See supra note 226. 
 231. See, e.g., Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 
2739 (2005) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd to 2000dd-1 (2006)); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 
466 (2004). 
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such detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and . . . the probative value 
(if any) of any such statement.”232 
The 2005 DTA requirement that administrative judges assess the 
probative value of coerced evidence was certainly a far cry from a total ban on 
statements derived from torture, but it nevertheless had the potential to bring 
matters of detainee abuse into the open and squarely before the Guantánamo 
tribunals.233 In any event, by the time the DTA was enacted, DOD had already 
conducted the vast majority of CSRTs and had only a few remaining.234 As a 
matter of practice, decisions were made to avoid relying on evidence that 
related to allegations of abuse. Thus, DOD was able to stave off potential legal 
interpretations by the administrative boards regarding the government’s 
evidentiary obligations under the CAT, and certainly did not itself make any 
pronouncement of those obligations.235 Nevertheless, these reforms did make it 
more feasible for DOD subsequently to bind itself to a clear statement on 
Article 15, which would have been much more difficult were DOD 
simultaneously planning to rely on such evidence as a matter of practice. 
Regardless of what precise factors led to the government’s ultimate 
statement to the CAT committee, it is difficult to imagine that had this exact 
issue instead first arisen in litigation at that time, government briefs would have 
included a categorical statement that Article 15 functioned as an exclusionary 
rule applicable at Guantánamo. The scant briefs that had addressed Article 15 
claims in the past had generally considered these claims as subsumed within 
constitutional considerations, or had refused to accept that international law 
would require suppression of statements.236 And in contemporary cases 
involving claims of CAT violations, such as Rasul, the responding DOJ briefs 
did not directly address—and certainly did not concede—those claims.237 
Instead, the relevant U.S. litigation positions focused on the argument that 
 
 232. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1005(b)(1), 119 
Stat. 2739, 2741 (2005) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd to 2000dd-1 (2006)).  
 233. Id. 
 234. Those remaining eventually included Khalid Sheik Mohammed and other High Value 
Detainees transferred to Guantánamo from CIA prisons in 2006. See, e.g., Gerry J. Gilmore, High-Value 
Detainees Moved to Gitmo; Bush Proposes Detainee Legislation, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Sept. 6, 
2006), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=721. 
 235. What relevance, if any, this determination or the government’s subsequent statement to the 
CAT Committee had to prior completed processes is unclear. Certainly DOD did not provide new 
CSRTs or ARBs to all of the detainees who had gone through the process previously, who presumably 
did not benefit from this understanding of Article 15, and the DTA specifically exempted prior 
proceedings from this clause’s reach. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, § 1005(b)(2) (2006). 
 236. See, e.g., Reply to Government’s Response to Muhammad Salah’s Motion To Suppress, 
United States v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 03 CR 978), 2005 WL 5818368, 
at *21 (arguing first that the international law inquiry regarding whether the statements are derived from 
torture is subsumed by the constitutional requirement that the statements be voluntary, and second that 
“suppression is not an appropriate remedy for a violation of international law”). 
 237. See, e.g., Individual Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss, Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 
26 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 04-1864), 2005 WL 6003479 at *18, *24 (arguing simply that “the Constitution 
does not apply extraterritorially to protect non-resident aliens from U.S. military operations outside the 
country” and that defendants “lacked sufficient connections to this Nation to be afforded constitutional 
protections even if they had been held on territory within the United States”). 
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detainees at Guantánamo did not have constitutional rights.238 Considering that 
the U.S. position to the Senate had been that the U.S. could effectuate its 
Article 15 obligations through already existing constitutional rights, it is 
unlikely that the litigators challenging in court the applicability of 
constitutional rights to Guantánamo would have been keen to concede similar 
rights stemming from a different source.239 It is likely that instead the litigation 
position would have highlighted prior U.S. statements about the non-self-
executing nature of the treaty provision, and might have avoided the merits 
question altogether.240 Had U.S. officials then found themselves before the 
CAT committee once the matter had already been the subject of litigation, they 
might have found themselves constrained by former statements made in briefs 
or they might have simply evaded the question by deferring to pending 
litigation. 
All of this raises the quite reasonable question: so what? After all, it is 
possible and likely that the U.S. government’s position at the time on what 
evidence was actually “established to have been made as a result of torture” 
did not correspond perfectly with that of the committee.241 It is even possible 
that differing understandings of exactly what this prohibition entailed were part 
of what permitted interagency agreement on making the statement to the CAT 
committee at all. Nevertheless, going forward, the executive and Congress have 
built on rather than narrowed the approach taken at the CAT committee.242 
Even throughout the Bush Administration there were multiple instances when 
military commission judges deemed inadmissible evidence they determined 
tainted by torture.243 
Moreover, the exact question of the U.S. government’s obligations under 
Article 15 in Guantánamo cases did ultimately arise in domestic litigation. In 
2009, in the context of a Guantánamo habeas case, Judge Kessler asked the 
parties to submit briefing on federal and international law concerning the 
admissibility of evidence procured by torture.244 DOJ litigators and other 
officials, with the assistance of lawyers throughout the interagency, scrambled 
to formulate a U.S. position on the matter. Whatever the range of potential 
interpretations on the table, it was surely difficult to disregard the fact that the 
 
 238. Id. 
 239. See supra Subsection III.A.6. 
 240. See supra note 215. 
 241. See, e.g., Greg Miller, Waterboarding Is Still an Option, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/07/nation/na-torture7 (emphasis added). 
 242. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 9488 (2006); Military 
Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948r (2006). Moreover, the applicability of Article 15 to 
detainees at Guantánamo raises broader questions concerning the lex specialis approach and 
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,491, 3 C.F.R. 13491 
(2009) (citing the CAT among the laws applicable to individuals detained in armed conflict). 
 243. See, e.g., Ruling on Defense Motion To Suppress Out-of-Court Statements of the Accused 
to Afghan Authorities (D-022), United States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 345 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20081104JawadD022Suppress.pdf. 
 244. Respondents’ Brief in Response to the Court’s Order of Sept. 4, 2009 at 1-2, Mohammed 
v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 248). 
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U.S. government had taken a firm stance on the applicability of Article 15 to 
Guantánamo back in 2006. If the Bush Administration could acknowledge the 
applicability of CAT Article 15 to the now discredited CSRT proceedings on 
Guantánamo, how could the Obama Administration deny its applicability in 
habeas proceedings in U.S. federal courts? Ultimately, DOJ filed a brief in 
response to Judge Kessler’s request, stating that “[c]onsistent with . . . the 
treaty obligations imposed by the Convention [Against Torture] on the United 
States as a State Party, the government does not and will not rely upon 
statements it concludes were procured through torture in the Guantanamo 
habeas litigation.”245 This position was no mere talking point. The U.S. 
government reviewed and in many cases withdrew numerous pieces of 
evidence that had been filed in the Guantánamo habeas cases in prior years.246 
And in a 2011 executive order providing for periodic review of continued 
detention at Guantánamo, established as a discretionary measure rather than an 
attempt to supplant mandatory habeas, and thus more akin to the obsolete 
ARBs, President Obama mandated that such review “be 
implemented . . . consistent with applicable law including . . . the Convention 
Against Torture . . . .”247 The resulting guidelines clarified that the review 
boards “shall not rely on information obtained as a result of torture or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment.”248 
It is impossible to know the relative influence of one particular factor on 
years of incremental decisionmaking. Nor is it possible to know whether the 
Obama Administration would have issued such categorical statements 
regarding the applicability of Article 15 to various procedures at Guantánamo 
regardless of the Bush Administration’s statements to the CAT Committee. It is 
worth reiterating that despite the assumed views of the new Administration, 
many other positions taken in litigation in this area nevertheless remained 
consistent after President Obama took office.249 Thus, it is certainly easy to 
imagine that the prior statement regarding the applicability of the Article 15 
rule to Guantánamo would have hindered the possibility of taking a different 
 
 245. Id. 
 246. See Obaydullah v. Obama, 688 F.3d 784, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (stating that petitioner’s 
“allegations of abuse led the government to withdraw reliance on [particular] statements he made”); 
Charlie Savage, Appeals Court Sides with Detainee, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2010, at A15 (noting that the 
government withdrew evidence). This fact alone suggests at a minimum that officials within the Obama 
and Bush Administrations likely had different views on the scope of the Article 15 obligation, as they 
made different decisions with respect to reliance on evidence. There was also a disparity in information, 
as many new allegations of taint came to light during the progress of habeas litigation. 
 247. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,227, § 10(b) (Mar. 7, 2011). 
 248. Deputy Sec’y of Def., Implementing Guidelines for Periodic Review of Detainees Held at 
Guantanamo Bay per Executive Order 13567, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Oct. 31, 2012), 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/DTM-12-005.pdf. 
 249. See, e.g., supra notes 120, 130-131 and accompanying text; see also March 13 Brief supra 
note 77 (making some changes to the government’s position on its legal authority to detain at 
Guantanamo, but nonetheless continuing to assert broad authority to militarily detain members and 
supporters of al Qaeda and Taliban forces, based on an expansive concept of membership in those 
groups). 
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position in 2009, and could have, in addition, provided a certain degree of 
political cover that made it easier to apply that provision going forward. 
Ultimately, it is unlikely that any one aspect of this protracted 
decisionmaking process was the deciding factor in the evolution of the 
executive’s legal views. Multiple features of this process came together in a 
perfect storm of sorts to enable the U.S. government to take a suddenly 
forward-leaning interpretation of its legal obligations. As Part III described and 
this case study illustrated, however, the unique nature of the particular 
interpretation catalysts at work can have a transformative effect on every step 
of the process, from the first responders who determine how the executive will 
engage with an issue, to the ultimate decisionmaking players, as well as on the 
pressures and interests at stake in a given decision. While the extent to which a 
resulting substantive decision turns on these factors will be case-specific and 
impossible to prove concretely, the significance of interpretation catalysts in 
shaping these decisions is undeniable. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERPRETATION CATALYST PHENOMENON 
Executive decisions are almost always over-determined, and thus it would 
be foolish to try to point to one particular factor and argue that it is the sole 
reason for a chain of events taking place and the eventual output. Interpretation 
catalysts are factors that influence processes; it is unlikely and certainly 
impossible to prove that they are the sole deciding factors in any given 
decision. But, as explored in the preceding sections, they do exert an 
undeniable influence. There are a number of implications that can be drawn 
from this description of executive dynamics in legal decisionmaking. 
A. Implications for Scholarship 
The description of interpretation catalysts advanced in this Article has 
implications for a number of ongoing debates in current scholarship, in 
particular, deliberation over the ideal placement of authority within the 
executive; why the executive arrives at particular understandings of its legal 
constraints; and the extent to which the positions taken by one presidential 
administration may bind the next, including the extent to which the President is 
constrained by law at all.250 
Considerations of institutional design and the ideal placement of 
decisionmaking authority within the executive, for example, are intimately 
connected to—and can be subverted or facilitated by—the role played by 
interpretation catalysts in informing these structures. This is illustrated by the 
examples in Part II of decisionmaking formally directed into particular fora, 
such as NSC committees or interagency task forces, but rechanneled by events 
or lawsuits into other decisionmaking processes.251 Thus, in contrast to the 
 
 250. See supra notes 7, 12-15, 37-38. 
 251. See supra Subsection II.B.2. 
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description of scholars like Elena Kagan and Bruce Ackerman who, 
respectively, endorse or warn against a powerful President commanding an 
increasingly politicized executive branch,252 presidential prerogatives are often 
thwarted by the interaction of internal and external factors with a massive, 
dynamic executive bureaucracy. Potential constraints on presidential 
decisionmaking include not only the structural constraints that are the focus of 
much scholarship, such as Congress or, internally, OLC; they also include the 
nature of the events themselves that drive that decisionmaking, and the 
interplay between those events and the organic reality of internal executive 
process. 
Interpretation catalysts also have significance for those seeking to divine 
reasons for particular positions taken by the executive. Much debate currently 
centers on whether and why the Obama Administration has chosen to adopt 
certain policies and legal interpretations of the prior Administration in the 
national security context. Scholars have pointed to rational, structural, and 
political reasons for this phenomenon. Some have argued, for example, that 
once in office Obama came to accept that “the threat is real” and that the Bush 
policies were “better-thought-out-than they realized,”253 or have noted 
structural impediments to change, such as the remarkable continuity of the 
individual players in the national security bureaucracy across the two 
Administrations, and the underlying career bureaucracy, which does not turn 
over with the new Administration.254 Still others have pointed to the dramatic 
change in political climate or political blunders the Administration made after 
taking office.255 These discussions do not address the role of interpretation 
catalysts, yet all of these factors are inextricably connected to the context in 
which decisions arose for the new Administration, and the processes and 
players that were triggered to resolve them. A study of the executive’s position 
on the lawful scope of detention authority, for example, would be incomplete 
without examining the critical role litigation played in driving the 
Administration to assert legal views formed under the distinct pressures 
described in Section III.A, rather than through the processes the Administration 
had intended to employ.256 
Moreover, interpretation catalysts have implications for longstanding 
debates surrounding whether and to what extent the executive is bound by law 
at all. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule offer a quite categorical approach to 
executive power, arguing that the law provides no per se constraint on the 
executive, nor should it, in times of emergency or otherwise.257 Scholars who 
have reached similar conclusions about the descriptive state of the presidency 
but are driven by opposing instincts with respect to the ideal, advocate greater 
 
 252. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, REPUBLIC, supra note 7; Kagan, supra note 37. 
 253. GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 6, at 25-26 (quoting Susan Collins). 
 254. Id. at 27. 
 255. See, e.g., KLAIDMAN, supra note 77. 
 256. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
 257. See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 8. 
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institutional constraints on executive power.258 Others have suggested a more 
nuanced approach to the relationship between the executive and legal 
constraint, one that takes into account constraints both internal—such as the 
role of OLC in constraining the President—and external such as Congress and 
the courts.259 The account of interpretation catalysts presented here provides 
valuable texture to all sides of this debate. Scholars persuaded by either the 
Posner/Vermeule or Ackerman approach to current executive constraints may 
see in this phenomenon a certain degree of ad hocery; the reality that different 
decisionmaking triggers and processes may result in different substantive 
outcomes certainly suggests a lack of essential truth about the right legal 
outcome, or at least a lack of consistency in the executive’s assessment of legal 
questions. Yet the interpretation catalysts account also reveals a rich 
bureaucracy and deep layers of intertwined decisionmaking that suggest the 
operation of legal and other constraints within the executive are far more 
complicated than whether and to what extent executive lawyers are willing to 
tell the President “no,” or whether the President listens to those lawyers. A 
thorough investigation of the limit and extent of Presidential power must take 
into account how legal questions arise, how the actors who address these 
questions view legal constraints on executive authority, and the structures and 
processes in place that allocate power among those actors and shape the 
resulting decisions. 
B. Implications for Advocates 
For those seeking to influence executive behavior, an understanding of 
the influence of interpretation catalysts is invaluable to an advocacy strategy. 
Understanding how external factors and decision entry points connect to the 
various levers and gears within a bureaucracy, and how they can operate to 
empower and undermine various players, is essential to understanding where 
one’s efforts may be most effective and where they can, in fact, be harmful to 
one’s cause. 
The risks of misunderstanding interpretation catalysts can be enormous. 
For example, conventional wisdom might suggest that litigation is the best 
means for effecting legal constraints on executive power. Yet a solely 
litigation-based strategy for effecting change in national security matters can 
backfire in long-lasting ways. As the preceding sections make clear, it is an 
understatement to say that any attempt to instigate radical change within the 
executive in this area through the vehicle of litigation faces a steep uphill 
 
 258. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, REPUBLIC, supra note 7. 
 259. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 6; Metzger, supra note 7, at 
425-26 (arguing that “[i]nternal checks can be, and often are, reinforced by a variety of external forces—
including not just Congress and the courts, but also state and foreign governments, international bodies, 
the media, and civil society organizations,” and that “the reinforcement can also work in reverse, with 
internal constraints serving to enhance the ability of external forces . . . to exert meaningful checks on 
the Executive Branch”); Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 7; Pildes, supra note 8. 
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battle.260 Consider even the strategy of turning to the courts to rein in the 
executive’s use of a war paradigm to address the conflict with al Qaeda in the 
years after 9/11. The Bush years are often cast as a time of momentous 
Supreme Court pushback against administration policies in areas where 
presidents had previously been awarded great deference. That is one narrative, 
and there is truth in it. Certainly the Court asserted itself on several occasions 
to keep the courts and Congress from being shut out completely from 
significant policies affecting the nation and individual rights. Yet despite the 
handful of rare wins for such advocates—and they are rare261—there is another 
story in this history that is less examined; it is a story of repeated years of 
litigation that did not radically alter the legal architecture for the Bush 
Administration’s policies in its “War on Terror.” Instead, this litigation 
entrenched it.262 
Officials in the Obama White House and Justice Department came into 
office determined to avoid the criticism of over-politicization of DOJ that 
plagued the last Administration. Yet they faced a status quo of eight years of 
litigation defending Bush-era practices, to which the inherently defensive 
nature of litigation was structurally inclined to defer; this in addition to political 
pressures and the incredibly fast-paced onslaught of litigation came together 
quite effectively to make it exceedingly difficult for the new Administration to 
change course and suddenly take new positions in litigation, above all those 
that might constrain government action or fail to defend past government 
policies.263 While room might technically exist for the Administration to later 
revisit these positions, once positions are taken in litigation—particularly if 
they are then accepted by courts—executive officials both feel less pressure to 
establish a more constraining position, and are unlikely to recommit time and 
resources to addressing it. 
Of course, the U.S. government does not win every case to which it is a 
party. And a binding decision from a federal court is thus significant potential 
upside for plaintiffs attempting to effect change in the executive’s actions, but 
 
 260. In the national security realm, much turns on the likelihood of court intervention, the 
political and practical consequences of that intervention, and the likelihood of effecting change through 
another means. Foreign jurisdictions where courts defer less to state action in this area, for example, 
present a very different calculus. 
 261. Since Boumediene, the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit (which has handled the vast 
majority of the national security litigation the U.S. government has faced) have not ruled against the 
government in any major national security case. The Supreme Court has in fact granted certiorari in very 
few cases and has permitted broad deference by lower courts to executive positions in this area. See, 
e.g., Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011) (denying petition for certiorari to determine whether 
courts could grant release of unlawfully-held Guantánano detainees into the United States); Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 262. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (permitting ongoing long-term 
military detention at Guantánamo with few specified review requirements); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557 (2006) (supporting the application of an armed conflict framework to the conflict with al-
Qaeda); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (upholding the right of habeas corpus for U.S. citizens 
detained on U.S. soil, but supporting the armed conflict paradigm and reading the AUMF to permit 
long-term military detention of such individuals without trial). 
 263. See supra note 249.  
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the risk is also enormous. If such plaintiffs lose—and it is not unreasonable to 
assume that they will in the national security context—the position that the 
executive takes in litigation is likely to be not only upheld but entrenched, 
giving that position that much more weight going forward.264 
Aspirations for executive change might include a range of goals: greater 
transparency, clarity of the executive’s position, change in policy or its 
implementation, or change in the legal position of the executive with respect to 
its obligations as a matter of law. As discussed above, the priority of these 
goals should affect the path taken to challenge executive positions. With an 
especially recalcitrant regime that is unlikely to respond to other more 
persuasive means of effecting change, or an executive that is bent on what the 
courts may deem process fouls (as they have viewed certain executive attempts 
to cut the other branches or particular players out of the decisionmaking 
process265), litigation may well be the only way to force the executive’s hand. 
When other potential avenues exist, however, private advocates might seek to 
employ interpretation catalysts that trigger the processes and elevate the players 
they believe will be most amenable to the particular outcome they are hoping to 
effectuate. 
C. Implications for the Courts 
Exploration of how interpretation catalysts can shape—and vary—the 
legal positions the executive takes on matters of national security and 
international law should force a rethinking of the current state of judicial 
deference in this area, on which this Article only skims the surface. Deference 
in the national security and foreign affairs area exists for many reasons, among 
them a belief in the superior expertise and political accountability of executive 
decisionmakers.266 Yet the phenomena demonstrated in this Article suggest that 
the positions the executive presents in litigation are not necessarily the result of 
such factors, but rather are often exactly what they purport to be: litigation 
positions.267 This should concern many supporters of the current state of 
deference. 
 
 264. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that judicial sanction of an executive action can be far more dangerous than the 
underlying action itself, by turning a “passing incident” into doctrine). 
 265. See Neal Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 65, 71 (2006) (arguing that the Court’s concern with the executive’s position was based on its 
lack of support both from Congress, and from “the bureaucracy, and in particular the Judge Advocates 
General and the State Department”); Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of 
Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV. 797, 822-23 (2012) (suggesting that the Hamdan Court was likely swayed by 
accounts “that the Administration had bypassed standard internal decision-making processes” in 
excluding military lawyers “from the process of developing a commission trial system”). One might 
even argue that it is in precisely these kinds of cases that the executive is most likely to lose the case in 
court, suggesting that such circumstances might present the best vehicles for litigation as a catalyst for 
progressive change. 
 266. See, e.g., Curtis Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 
664 (2000). 
 267. See, e.g., Pillard, supra note 61, at 683 (noting that “[t]he SG’s and OLC’s formal 
doctrinalism and their courtlike insulation from the day-to-day functioning of government mean that 
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Administrative law jurisprudence in fact suggests that with perfect 
information, judges would not choose to defer to mere litigation positions.268 
But in order to avoid doing so, they require an understanding of the internal 
processes used to arrive at the government’s position in the case before them; 
the executive is not likely of its own accord to alert the court that a litigation 
position conflicted with the considered views of a relevant agency (though 
there are sometimes clues for close observers).269 Yet whichever criterion most 
interests the court in choosing to defer—be it expertise, accountability, fluency 
in historical precedent, or role in the formation of foreign policy or 
international law270—such choice might engage the relative competence of a 
different component of the executive branch. Thus, in order to defer to a 
particular executive capability, the courts need to understand which 
component’s view they are assessing. 
One way courts might target their deference more precisely at specific 
executive capabilities is to condition specialized deference based on the 
engagement of specific actors or processes. While this may sound aggressive, it 
is not entirely novel. Kagan and Barron argue in Chevron’s Nondelegation 
Doctrine that courts should differentiate among internal agency actors when 
assessing the standard of review to afford an agency’s decision, and should 
award Chevron deference only when a particular decision “bears the name of 
the statutory delegate” following “a meaningful review of the interpretation by 
the delegatee or her close advisors.”271 In fact, whether and how courts choose 
to examine the underlying process behind the government’s litigation position 
can influence how the government designs and follows that process. Magill and 
Vermeule have argued that administrative law jurisprudence—in particular, 
rules granting more or less deference to agency lawmaking—operates to 
elevate or weaken the influence of different officials within agencies.272 Kagan 
and Barron have taken this concept a step further to argue that courts should 
incentivize particular executive decisionmaking by rewarding those processes 
 
they lack the insight into executive practical experience and varied institutional capabilities or 
limitations that distinguish the executive from the courts”). 
 268. Barron & Kagan, supra note 28, at 260. 
 269. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Solicitor General as Mediator Between Court and 
Agency, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 197 (2009) (noting that “it can be extraordinarily difficult to 
determine whether the arguments presented in the SG’s briefs represent the views of the relevant 
agency”). But see infra note 275 (noting the role of agencies’ signatures on Solicitor General briefs as 
evidence of agreement in some cases). 
 270. See Ingrid Weurth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1931 (2010) (arguing that the executive branch should receive deference 
where it “can demonstrate a strong interest in (or prior position with respect to) the formation of a 
particular norm of customary international law”). 
 271. Barron & Kagan, supra note 28, at 201-02, 239. 
 272. Magill & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 1079-80 (arguing that greater judicial review 
empowers lawyers within agencies, and that when “there is little threat of judicial review, . . . lawyers 
lose their place at the table as the agency debates and deliberates over the action”). I do not necessarily 
agree that the lack of judicial review entails a lack of attorney involvement within the executive, but 
certainly judicial interaction with the executive has a strong influence on the relative importance of 
specific attorneys within agencies, and litigators in particular. 
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that result in decisionmaking at a higher level.273 Thus, judges wishing to 
incentivize greater influence for particular types of actors within the 
government—be they officials who have more expertise, are more accountable, 
or are more independent (each of which may pull in different directions)—can 
do so simply by conditioning their deference on whether such actors are 
involved. 
Courts could choose more formally to engage the practice of seeking 
clarity on executive decisionmaking as a condition of deference, whether or not 
they wish to incentivize particular kinds of decisionmaking. Deference-shifting 
would be a much softer approach than a requirement of transparency into 
internal executive deliberation, which would raise a host of separation-of-
powers concerns. Instead, decisions regarding whether and how to change 
internal procedures and how much information to provide to the court would be 
left to the executive, which could always choose to rely on a merits-based 
argument rather than a request for judicial deference. Such a deference-shifting 
approach would simply condition deference to expertise or accountability on 
executive willingness to demonstrate that those internal components with 
specific competencies were sufficiently involved or had cleared on the 
position.274 U.S. government officials already employ a kind of signaling in 
certain circumstances, to subtly alert the court that agency officials are on 
board with a position, through the practice of agency officials’ signing of briefs 
that are particularly relevant to an agency’s interests; similarly, the unusual 
absence of a signature can signal that official’s displeasure with the product.275 
This practice could take on a more formal status with the courts. 
There is some evidence in the national security arena that courts are 
interested in peering behind the executive curtain to some extent. In some 
cases, judges have questioned or given less deference to statements made by 
DOJ officials when they viewed such statements as either not sufficiently 
 
 273. Barron & Kagan, supra note 28, at 201-02, 204, 239 (arguing that courts should “reward, 
through more deferential judicial review, interpretations offered by more responsible officials,” thus 
“offering an incentive to certain actors to take responsibility for interpretive choice, [so as to] advance[] 
both accountability and discipline in decision making”). 
 274. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012) (arguing that courts may attach greater deference to decisions arrived at 
through greater interagency coordination); Derek Jinks & Neal K. Katyal, Disregarding Foreign 
Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1280 (2007) (arguing that the executive should not receive judicial 
deference in the foreign affairs realm when it bypasses “existing channels and procedures” and 
“interagency debate,” and disregards agency expertise). 
 275. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 269, at 200 (“treat[ing] an agency’s signature on the SG’s 
brief as evidence of agreement, and an agency’s failure to join the brief as evidence of disagreement,” 
though acknowledging that “an agency’s decision to join the SG’s brief is at best a rough proxy for 
agreement with the arguments presented there”); Savage, supra note 122 (stating that the chief 
prosecutor of the military commissions system “pointedly did not sign” the appellate brief in a case he 
had urged the Justice Department to drop.); John Bellinger, Kiobel: Obama Administration Supports 
Shell, Argues ATS Should Not Apply to Aiding-and-Abetting Suits Against Foreign Corporations, Leaves 
Open Possibility of Suits Against U.S. Corporations, LAWFARE, (June 13, 2012, 7:55 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/06/kiobel-obama-administration-supports-shell-argues-ats-should-not 
-apply-to-aiding-and-abetting-suits-against-foreign-corporations-leaves-open-possibility-of-suits-against 
-u-s-corporations (highlighting the State Department’s absence on the brief’s signature page, despite its 
regular inclusion in ATS briefs). 
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coordinated with particular individuals, or as mere litigation positions, contrary 
to views of “experts.”276 Yet in others, judges have explicitly disregarded 
agency views made outside litigation as not representing the considered views 
of the executive branch as a whole.277 The discussion of decisionmaking 
processes advanced here, however, suggests that there is little reason for courts 
to view the positions of the attorneys before them in litigation as the products 
of necessarily greater input or coordination than the positions put forward in 
executive reports, speeches, testimony, or other statements by executive 
officials. 
D. Implications for Executive Branch Actors 
Last, executive branch officials, including the President, must understand 
the nature and influence of interpretation catalysts in order to operate 
effectively and accomplish their goals within the government. This is 
particularly critical for new administrations that come into power with specific 
policies they intend to influence or implement. Interpretation catalysts can 
provide useful windows for effecting change. But they can also thwart intended 
structures by diverting a process from a formally-established channel into 
another, such as an organic process that has historically been triggered by a 
particular catalyst. 
For those inclined to change institutional design so as to maximize 
presidential or political control over decisionmaking, the phenomena discussed 
in this Article suggest two potential lessons. First, this requires maintaining 
decisionmaking processes within the structures the President or others intend 
for those purposes, such as the formal task forces and other processes 
established by executive orders. As has been discussed, these processes can be 
diverted into other channels by the press of real events; maintaining the 
intended channels requires devoting sufficient resources and authority to the 
individuals intended to manage such processes, including the ability to overrule 
or intercede in decisions made in other fora. 
Second, to the extent restricting decisionmaking to particular channels is 
not always possible (and this Article suggests that it is not), those seeking to 
prioritize certain processes can do so by apportioning weight or precedential 
value to decisions, even legal interpretations, according to the particular 
method used and participants involved in reaching them.278 Thus, for example, 
 
 276. See, e.g., Katyal, supra 265; Pearlstein supra note 265. 
 277. For example, in the district court opinion in Rasul v. Rumsfeld, the court dismisses what it 
terms a “State Department report,” thus suggesting its view that the U.S. Government lacks a unified 
position or that the State Department did not necessarily represent it. Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 
26, 32 n.5 (D.D.C. 2006). Contrast this with Justice Stevens’ reliance on a law review article by then-
Legal Adviser Taft as evidence of the Executive’s position on law-of-war rules applicable to al Qaeda. 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 278. There is no clear manual on how the executive weighs statements made in particular 
processes beyond OLC precedent, but it is certainly a non-trivial event to part ways with prior stated 
legal positions. The discussion in Section III.A additionally suggests that there is great pressure to 
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positions established by interagency consensus through long deliberation and 
intensive coordination—such as those taken in particular treaty reports or 
speeches—would take precedence over those taken under time pressure and 
with limited coordination—such as those taken in short-fuse litigation 
decisions. There is little reason to believe, considering the externally-created 
time pressure and framing of the questions at stake, that urgent litigation 
deadlines create the ideal circumstances for arriving at the considered views of 
the executive, particularly when the President has established other processes. 
Therefore, one lesson to internal actors and the President may be to redesign 
structures and assumptions so as to preempt litigation-driven decisions to the 
extent possible by anticipating questions likely to be raised and addressing 
them in alternate fora and, when preemption is impractical, to permit space ex 
post for formalized reconsideration of decisions made under exigent 
circumstances, significant time pressure, or otherwise without sufficient 
consensus among critical parties.279 Moreover, differences between 
interpretation catalysts might be unavoidable, but they need not be quite so 
stark. Greater emphasis could be placed on collaboration between agencies; for 
example, authority over litigation positions might be shared with the client 
agencies whose interests are at stake. 
For those who must work within existing structures, the most effective 
operators within the executive use interpretation catalysts and related 
procedural factors to their advantage.280 Interpretation catalysts can create 
opportunities in addition to hurdles. Those whose roles are elevated by certain 
processes may angle to keep decisionmaking within the processes that grant 
them or their agency the greatest control over the ultimate decision. Individuals 
who are left out of the loop may seek ways to gain a seat at the table, such as by 
seeking to present a speech on a matter, and thus give themselves the pen in 
crafting a particular presentation of the government’s position. They may try to 
engage internal or external factors to move a matter into a process in which 
they have greater authority, such as by taking advantage of treaty body 
reporting processes or working with a congressional committee to bring matters 
to the fore within a particular process that will emphasize their participation.281 
Process and structure matter a great deal but these factors alone—and the 
catalysts triggering them—cannot entirely explain or justify executive 
decisionmaking. In fact, responsible officials should make all efforts to rise 
above these challenges in order to promote and establish their best view of the 
law and the correct course of action and policies. In order to do so, however, it 
 
adhere to prior positions taken in litigation and that any change is considered dramatic. See, e.g., supra 
note 141. 
 279. Reconsideration has its limits. When decisions are made in the course of litigation, 
reconsideration will inevitably need to factor in the resulting judicial decision and the risk of upending 
settled cases. 
 280. See supra Section III.C. 
 281. See Metzger, supra note 7 (discussing the interdependence of internal and external 
constraints). 
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is essential to understand the procedural and structural phenomena that 
inherently influence—and can hinder—effective decisionmaking. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to conventional views of executive lawyering, which posit a 
difficult but bilateral tension between law and principles, on the one hand, and 
the President’s wishes and policies on the other, the legal architecture of the 
U.S. executive is in fact a complex, dynamic, and multifaceted community of 
players and decision mechanisms that engage or retreat according to the unique 
task at hand and the forum in which it arises. How a question is first raised and 
framed affects the processes employed to address it, the nature of the players at 
the table, their authority, and the contextual pressures that shape the enterprise. 
Interpretation catalysts, which trigger and frame these questions, thus play a 
dramatic role within the executive in forcing a decision to the fore and shaping 
every step of the process toward the ultimate substantive result. 
The significant role of interpretation catalysts in executive branch legal 
decisionmaking may provoke different reactions depending on one’s view of a 
commanding Oval Office or a centralized executive legal process. The reality 
of executive legal decisionmaking described in this Article is neither one of 
perfect unitary cohesion nor is it completely ad hoc. Rather, the picture is richly 
textured and provides fodder for theorists on all sides of debates about 
executive power. For those seeking greater political control over executive 
legal process, the picture this Article presents should be a call to arms to 
implement greater top-down order on decisionmaking channels, and to assign 
weight to legal decisions according to the particular process taken. For those 
seeking greater internal constraints on executive action, this Article 
demonstrates not only that these constraints do exist, but that external actors 
and events can and do influence the internal balance of power. 
 
